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The primary objective of the present study was to exper­
imentally test the hypothesis that moral development could 
be fostered in first-grade children by reading them morality 
stories selected for their content similarity to the induc­
tion child-rearing techniques described by Hoffman and Saltz-
stein (1967). The induction technique involved instructing 
the child concerning the consequences of his misdeeds on 
others. 
In order to assess the treatment effect of the morality 
stories, the researcher developed the Moral Development Inven­
tory (M.D.I.) for measuring level of moral development in 
first-grade children. This instrument, modeled after a guilt 
inventory used in the Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) study, 
consisted of four Inventory Stories. Each story contained a 
protagonist the age of the subjects to be tested. In each 
story, the protagonist committed a misdeed known only to him­
self. In the administration of the instrument, the subject 
was asked to complete each Inventory Story by choosing from 
three possible endings, each ending corresponding to either 
high, medium, or low level of guilt. A pilot study (N = 316 
first graders) confirmed that the instrument was suitable for 
use with first-grade subjects. The M.D.I, was then adminis­
tered to 73 first graders in Walton County, Florida. A 
numerical score (R = 4-12) was obtained for each subject. 
Each subject•s score was correlated with a respective morality-
rating from his teacher (r = .37, jd<.001), which resulted 
in the rejection of the null hypothesis that there would be 
no significant relationship between the subject's score on 
the M.D.I, and the teacher rating of the subject's morality. 
A positive relationship (r = .32, g <\01) between the subject's 
M.D.I, score and his score on the language portion of the 
Comprehensive Tests of Basic Skills indicated that the M.D.I, 
contained a language factor. Split-half reliability (r = .63, 
£•<.001), test-retest reliability (r = .82), and a non­
significant F max statistic for homogeneity of variances 
justified the acceptance of the M.D.I, as a satisfactory 
research instrument for assessing the subjects in the exper­
iment . 
The subjects in the experiment were 27 first graders 
assigned to experimental conditions and 27 first graders 
assigned to control conditions. All subjects were from 
Walton County, Florida, schools. The experimental subjects 
were read one morality story each day for five consecutive 
days. The control subjects were read one nonmorality story 
in like manner. The subjects were administered the M.D.I. 
after the reading of the fifth treatment story. The experi­
mental effects were assessed by a three-way ANOVA, which 
determined that there was a significant main effect for group, 
a significant effect for sex, and a significant effect for 
group by sex. The analysis indicated no significant dif­
ferences in treatment effect on the individual Inventory 
Stories, but there was a significant three-way (sex x group 
x story) interaction. Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons on 
the mean scores revealed that the differences were primarily 
related to the very low scores of the control males and the 
lack of significant treatment effect on the females. 
In summary, it was found that the treatment effect as 
measured by the M.D.I, was highly significant with the male 
subjects but not with the female subjects. Possible explana­
tions were discussed. The research has definite implications 
for parents and educators. The induction technique for 
fostering moral development would seem to be an effective 
procedure for producing moral children, especially males. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent societal concerns about morality have provided 
a strong impetus for renewed study of moral development. 
It is probably more than coincidence that the student 
activism of the 19601s, the rising crime rate, and 
such heavily publicized events as Watergate and the 
street murder of Kitty Genovese have their parallels 
in the intensification of research on internalization 
of moral norms. (Hoffman, 1977, p. 275) 
Concerned social critics such as David Reisman (Janis, 1969) 
and Erick Fromm (Janis, 1969) have pointed to the trend in 
modern society toward other-directedness rather than inner-
directedness for the regulation of conduct. Among many 
people in powerful managerial and executive positions, 
deceit and exploitation, formerly inhibited through the 
individual1 s own moral code, are now deterred only by the 
threat of punishment. Across the United States, a pattern 
of crime has emerged that is both perplexing and appalling. 
"A new remorseless, mutant juvenile seems to have been 
born, and there is no more terrifying figure in America 
today" (The Youth Crime Plague, 1977, p. 18). The power black­
out on July 13, 1977, plunged New York City into a darkness 
followed by an orgy of looting and wanton destructiveness 
that shocked the city and most of the world. Normal explana­
tions seemed inadequate, as the people involved in the 
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crimes did not seem to be needy or hungry. "It was just 
like The Lord of the Flies. People resort to savage behav­
ior when the brakes of civilization fail," wrote Ernest 
Dichter, a noted psychologist (Night of terror, p. 17). 
These indications pointed toward a time of moral crisis, 
described by Hall and Davis (1975) as a state of society in 
which people have, for whatever reason, lost their sense of 
what is right and what is wrong. Societies have dealt 
with this problem before. Solutions have ranged from 
stricter punishment to increased emphasis on moral education 
and were generally related to whichever theory of explana­
tion was current. 
When the study of morality was the exclusive domain of 
theology and philosophy, the origin of morality was attrib­
uted to the child's basic nature. Augustinian philosophy 
advocated that the child must be saved from his sinful nature 
by punishment. Followers of Locke maintained that the 
child's morality depended upon his training and experiences 
(Bijou, 1975). This latter view suggested the need for moral 
education. 
Some people are convinced that the best process for 
reestablishing a foundation for ourselves in the moral 
domain is to reconsider and reevaluate the basic values 
that have been handed down through our religious and 
cultural traditions. (Hall & Davis, 1975, p. 19) 
John Wilson, director of the Farmington Trust Research Unit 
in Oxford, England from 1965 until 1973, developed the first 
contemporary program for moral education (Hall & Davis, 1975). 
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Wilson's orientation was philosophical and centered on 
teaching the awareness of other people's feelings and emo­
tions. This approach assumed that moral development could 
be fostered, a concept certainly not alien to that of John 
Dewey (1909), who advocated democratic experimental schools for 
moral and intellectual development seventy years ago. He 
believed that the aim of education was to aid in the build­
ing of a free and powerful character (Hall & Davis, 1975). 
Lack of moral education in today1s schools was sug­
gested as a major contributor toward moral decline, but 
the mere phrase "moral education" stirred uneasiness in 
some educators (Sanborn, 1971). Social scientists had dis­
couraged the idea of imposing middle-class educator values 
on all children, and educators were encouraged to accept 
variation in moral standards as a democratic ideal. Rather 
than creating a situation of greater individual freedom in 
the area of moral beliefs and ideals, the offical laissez-
faire policy produced what amounted to a shallowness of 
thought and commitment (Hall & Davis, 1975). Hersh and 
Paolitto (1977) presented strong possible implications for 
moral development in the schools. Strategies such as role 
playing, peer counseling, learning ethical philosophy, tutor­
ing, interviewing, and moral discussions to stimulate moral 
development were suggested. Mills (1977), in answer to 
questions concerning problems of living in a society where 
there is no common religious perspective, suggested that 
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schools should inform the pupils about different traditions 
and should emphasize the salient points in the various moral 
beliefs. If possible, pupils should be introduced to people 
who claim that such traditions and beliefs have helped them 
in their moral lives. Mills further stressed the role of 
the teacher as a moral model before the students. 
Teachers must show that they are not only concerned 
with academic problems of attributing moral appraisals, 
but that they are also concerned to put these moral 
evaluations into practice. There are two aspects to 
this: (a) the example of personal habits and behavior, 
and (b) a wider concern for morality in society. 
(p. 167) 
There appears to be new interest in re-assuming this 
responsibility (Hersh & Paolitto, 1977; Mills, 1977). It ap­
pears that the current increase in lack of moral develop­
ment has become the stimulant. It was the purpose of this 
study to investigate the methods most effective for obtain­
ing positive results. 
Theoretical Orientation 
There were three major theories which attempted to 
explain the origin of morality (Hoffman/ 1970: McCandless & 
Evans, 1973). The concept of "original sin," which was 
included in most monotheistic religions, assumed early inter­
vention by adults as essential to the ultimate salvation of 
the child. Classical psychoanalysis also accepted this 
concept. The young child was viewed as a bundle of libido 
drives which had to be subordinated by significant adults 
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in his life, precursors to the development of the child's 
own superego or internal control. In contrast, the doctrine 
of "innate purity" viewed adult society as a possible corrupt­
ing influence which had to be minimized in the early years 
of the child's development. Many cognitive-developmental 
psychologists accepted this doctrine, which placed great 
emphasis on the role of higher mental processes in moral 
development. The third doctrine, tabula rasa, assumed that 
the infant was infinitely malleable. Social learning theory 
was a descendant of this doctrine. 
Each theoretical approach, in keeping with its philo­
sophical base, defined morality and guided the empirical 
research in its own domain. F.reudian research was concerned 
with the morality index guilt which resulted when moral 
standards were violated. The warning function of the con­
science was described as associated with guilt (Fenichel, 
1945). The belief was that the individual who had a highly 
developed sense of guilt would be a person of high moral 
character, self-controlled to avoid the punishment of 
internalized guilt (Redl & Wineman, 1951). Social learning 
theory emphasized strengthening "good" behaviors through 
reinforcement. Social learning theory also viewed the con­
struct guilt as one of the measurable indices of moral 
internalization. This theory generated research which 
attempted to relate child-rearing practices to moral develop­
ment (Hoffman, 1970). The cognitive developmentalists 
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believed that moral development was in large part a function 
of maturation within a context of general age-related exper­
iences. In this latter view, the human organism matured in 
accord with his biological nature interacting with his 
environment. Although specific teaching was not the pri­
mary concern of the cognitive-developmental school, Kohlberg 
and Turiel (1971), proponents of this school, developed a 
general plan for moral education that resembles programmed 
learning. 
Within the theoretical framework of each of the three 
major doctrines of morality, teaching has a definite, if 
variable, role in the child's moral development. Social 
learning theory, however, through its research relating 
child-rearing practices to moral development (Hoffman, 1970) 
and the Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) research that found 
high moral development in children positively related to 
induction techniques of child-rearing, inspired this research. 
In the present study, the induction technique, (which is 
essentially a teaching method), was experimentally tested as 
a potential educational method for increasing the level of 
moral development in first-grade children. 
Background for the Study 
The fact that our ancestors lived and died for thousands 
of years without showing the slightest interest in children 
as children was supportive of the concept that children are 
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no more intrinsically interesting than sardines or prime 
numbers (Watson & Lindgren, 1973). The great interest in 
child development today has resulted from a special com­
bination of values, attitudes, and precepts that charac­
terized our society. The study of child development may be 
viewed as a byproduct of our strivings to become democratic. 
American parents, unsure of themselves as educators of chil­
dren for a society that offered status flexibility in its 
social structure, consulted child specialists both about their 
child's behavior and about their own attitudes toward him 
(Dolto, 1955). This desire of parents to know what exper­
iences would help children realize their best potential 
as adults has continued to be a compelling impetus for 
research. A strong current of interest in personality and 
socialization appeared in the 1950's, and of particular 
interest was the study of the effects of child-rearing prac­
tices on such personality variables and constructs as 
anxiety, hostility, aggression, need for achievement, and 
morality. This interest was due partly to the strong 
psychoanalytic orientation that was prevalent in the child 
guidance movement (Watson & Lindgren, 1973). Psychoanalytic 
theory, which stressed the importance of the parent, provided 
the main theoretic inspiration for most of the research in 
the role of parental practices in shaping and determining 
moral character (Hoffman, 1970). Researchers have generally 
focused on the child's anxiety over anticipated loss of 
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parental love as the prime motivator for the child's obtain­
ing control over his behavior in accord with parental 
dictates (Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957). Love withdrawal, 
with its highly punitive quality, was found to relate infre­
quently to moral indices in several studies (Burton, Maccoby, 
& Allinsmith, 1961; Grinder, 1962: Sears, Rau, & Alpert, 
1965). Hoffman (1975a) reviewed the research on child-
rearing antecedents of gviilt and found support for the gen­
eralization that moral orientation was associated with the 
mother's frequent use of inductive discipline techniques 
which indicated the consequences of the child's behavior 
for others. 
The effectiveness of induction as discipline, as 
compared to power assertion and love withdrawal, 
appears to be based less on the fear of punishment 
and more on the child's connecting its cognitive 
substance with his own resources for comprehending 
the necessities in the situation and controlling 
his own behavior accordingly. (Hoffman, 1970, 
p. 286) 
Of the studies reviewed, all were correlational and 
provided no justification for inferring causality. There 
was some evidence to suggest that the child often affected 
the parents' behavior (Bell, 1971; Harper, 1971; Rheingold, 
1969). A definite answer to the problem of causal direc­
tion required experimental work. The background literature 
on the variables believed to be associated with moral devel­
opment and the existing dearth of experimental work were 
motivators for the present study. 
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Statement of the Problem 
The present study was designed to determine the effect 
of morality content stories on first-grade children by 
measuring their responses to a Moral Development Inventory 
developed by the researcher. The problem considered in this 
study was suggested by Hoffman and Saltzstein's (1967) 
finding of a high relationship between inductive child-
rearing techniques and high moral development in the child, 
as measured by the index guilt. The morality content sto­
ries were chosen to duplicate inductive techniques; that is, 
communicate information to the child concerning the painful 
consequences of his misdeeds for others. The concept that 
moral development could be fostered through literature was 
advocated by John Dewey more than seventy years ago (Hall & 
Davis, 1975), but it had not been experimentally tested. 
A further purpose of this study was to develop an 
instrument for determining the level of moral development 
in first-grade children by measuring the index guilt. 
Guilt had been widely accepted as an indice for measuring the 
level of moral development (Ausubel, 1958; Freud, 1964; Hoff­
man & Saltzstein, 1967; Puiynski, 1975), and it was used as 
the dependent variable in this study. 
Questions and Hypotheses 
The basic questions in this study were the following: 
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1. Is it possible to foster moral development in the 
first-grade child by reading him morality content stories, 
chosen to duplicate the inductive method described by 
Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967)? 
2. Is it possible to develop an instrument for 
assessing moral development in first-grade children which 
will satisfy the criteria for reliability and validity? 
3. Is the testing of first-grade children on a mul­
tiple-choice test adversely affected by response mode? 
4. Do the levels of guilt, described by Hoffman and 
Saltzstein (196 7) (see Appendix B), appear in the first-
grade child? 
5. Do male and female first-grade children differ in 
level of moral development as measured by the Moral Devel­
opment Inventory? 
The following null hypotheses were stated: 
1. There is no difference in level of moral devel­
opment as measured by the Moral Development Inventory in 
the experimental group of first-graders read morality con­
tent stories and the control group read stories without 
morality content. 
2. There is no difference in level of moral 
development measured by the Moral Development Inventory as 
a function of sex of subject. 
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3. There is no relationship between teacher rating 
of first-grade children's level of moral development and the 
children's rating on the Moral Development Inventory. 
4. The subject's response to the multiple choice test 
is not related to any response set order preference. 
5. There is no relationship between the children's 
level of language development as measured by the Comprehen­
sive Tests of Basic Skills and their level of moral develop­
ment as measured by the Moral Development Inventory. 
Implications of the Study 
The topic of the present study has implications for 
parents, educators, and child development specialists. Recent 
years have seen the accumulation of a body of findings relat­
ing moral development to parental practices. This study, 
which experimentally tested the relationship between the 
induction technique, a potential child-rearing variable, and 
moral development in first-grade children offers further 
guidance to parents along this dimension. 
It was found that a positive relationship existed 
between the children's moral development and their mental 
health (Johnson & Medinnus, 1974; Mowrer, 1967). It would 
seem plausible that data which delineated methods for foster­
ing moral development would also be advantageous to all per­
sons who had contact with children and were concerned about 
their total development. The educator assumes considerable 
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responsibility for the development of children when chil­
dren enter the first grade. Information concerning the 
relevance of morality content literature on the children's 
moral development would have value for teachers and school 
curriculum coordinators. 
A dearth of information existed with respect to 
younger children and to the presence of guilt as an intern­
alized moral controller. The development of an instrument 
for the measurement of guilt as an indicator of moral devel­
opment would give educators and researchers the means to 
evaluate the moral effectiveness of various programs used 
with first-grade children. 
Finally# the study had design implications for exper­
imentally testing that which has previously been studied 
correlationally, e.g., child-rearing methods and moral 
development of children. 
Limitations of the Study 
The following limitations were considered pertinent to 
any interpretations of this study. 
1. Generalizations are limited to subjects that are 
like those in the study—predominantly white, middle-class, 
first-grade children from Walton County, Florida. Demographic 
data from the Walton County school system was used to 
justify the middle-class designation. As such, the subjects 
were similar to those that formed the body of research on moral 
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development (Hall & Davis, 1975; Hurlock, 1964? Yarrow, Camp­
bell, & Burton, 1968). 
2. The subjects were limited to first-grade children. 
It was the intent of this study to determine whether guilt, 
an index of moral development, existed and could be measured 
in first-grade children. As such, this study may have con­
tributed valuable data for answering questions concerning the 
age when the emotion guilt first appears in children. There 
was no attempt in this study to evaluate age-trend effects. 
The first-grade subjects used were all within nine months of 
the same age. At least three separate age levels must be 
studied in order to determine the relation of the phenomena 
in question to age (Anderson, 1956; Hicks, 1973; Winer, 1962). 
The present study then was cross-sectional and could only 
have developmental implication when viewed in the total con­
text with other age-specific studies. Anderson (1956) noted 
that as early as the 1950's there were particular level 
studies, each adding to the total picture of development. 
3. Only the subjects that were present for the five 
consecutive days of the experiment were included. In this 
sense, the study population may be seen as a self-selected 
group. The use of four different classrooms was expected to 
reduce the selectivity bias of absenteeism. 
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4. The Moral Development Inventory, adapted from the 
inventory used in the Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) study, 
was validated by determining the relationship between the 
teacher ratings of the child's probable responses in a moral 
situation and the child's responses to the test. There was 
ample precedent for this method (Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967; 
Miller & Swanson, I960; Sears, 1961). It was not feasible in 
this study to compare the child's verbal responses with his 
overt behavior. This is definitely a limitation, the elim­
ination of which justifies further research. 
5. Subjecting the Moral Development Inventory to a 
test-retest reliability evaluation had the possible instru­
ment effect error discussed by Turiel (1966) in discussing 
Kohlberg1s instrument for measuring level of moral reasoning. 
The story content of the Moral Development Inventory may have 
contributed to the child's choosing the answer he remembered 
from the previous test administration. 
6. The treatment effect was limited to five consecu­
tive days. Although there were precedents for the effec­
tiveness of brief treatments (Ambron & Irwin, 1975; Johnson 
& Medinnus, 1974), experimental designs have often been lim­
ited by conditions of accessibility to subjects. This 
researcher was convinced that the validation of the Moral 
Development Inventory required the close teacher-student 
familiarity that increased over time. Therefore it was 
considered necessary to run the experiment late in the 
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school year. Permission to intervene in the program of 
the public schools was thus limited to one week because of 
the inevitable rush of events that had to be accommodated 
in the latter weeks of school. It was also a limitation of 
this study that no provision was feasible for retesting 
terminal treatment effect. 
7. Inherent in all research using constructs is the 
limitation of the research findings and interpretations to 
the specific definition of terms outlined in the study. 
Adherence to those definitions is essential for replication 
studies (Cronbach & Drenth, 1972). 
Assumptions 
The following assumptions were made concerning the 
present study: 
1. Guilt was a measurable index for ascertaining level 
of moral development in first-grade children. 
2. The children's responses to the Moral Development 
Inventory indicated identification with the protagonist in 
the stories. 
3. The first-grade children chosen for participation 
in the study were representative of a larger general popula­
tion of middle-class first-grade children. 
4. The teachers' ratings for the children were reliably 
reported. 
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Definitions of Terms 
The following definitions were established for this 
study: 
Construct validity refers to how well the data generated 
by a test enables conclusions to be drawn about the nature 
of the particular construct with which the researcher is 
working (Cronbach, 1970). 
Empathy is the ability to appreciate how someone else 
feels by putting yourself into his position and experiencing 
his feelings. 
Guilt is a kind of negative emotion which occurs when 
an individual acknowledges that his behavior is at variance 
with a given moral value to which he feels obligated to con­
form (Ausubel, 1955). In the present study guilt is consid­
ered an index of moral development. 
Identification is the gradual process by which individ­
uals adopt as their own the characteristics, attitudes, 
values, or beliefs of others. Most frequently, identification 
will be with a parent (Johnson & Medinnus, 1974). 
Induction refers to the process whereby the child has 
pointed out to him the painful consequences of his misdeeds 
on others (Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967). 
Internalization is the incorporation of the values and 
beliefs of others as one's own (Hurlock, 1964). 
Moral development refers to the process whereby indi­
viduals adopt the standards of right and wrong laid down by 
their culture. 
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Socialization is a lifelong process by which individuals 
develop the values and beliefs, knowledge, awareness of 
social expectations, and appropriate role behavior (Watson & 
Lindgren, 1973). 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OP LITERATURE 
The predominance of guilt as an index of moral develop­
ment was reflected in the diversity of literature on the sub­
ject. Psychoanalytic, cognitive-developmental and social 
learning theorists have approached the study of moral devel­
opment from different perspectives, varying radically on 
conclusions drawn. Major areas of concern included morality 
antecedents and prerequisites for moral internalization. 
Such variables as childrearing techniques/ innate predisposi­
tions, and developmental age trends were studied (Sears, 
Maccoby, & Levin, 1957; Watson & Lindgren, 1973; Yarrow, 
Campbell, & Burton, 1968). Tenuous conclusions from these 
studies stressed the need for experimental research. 
No attempt was made to survey the entire field of lit­
erature related to guilt and moral development. The litera­
ture reviewed included studies relating the inductive child-
rearing technique to the child's morality. The literature 
from the three major psychological theories of moral devel­
opment was reviewed for background enrichment. Although 
the etiology of guilt includes sex guilt, hostile guilt, 
terminal guilt, maximum guilt, and morality-conscience guilt 
(Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967; Mosher, 1966), only the latter 
two areas were reviewed in the present study. 
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The study of morality has slipped in and out of focus 
as a central area of interest in child development (Albert 
& KlucKhorn, 1959). Generally, the study of moral develop­
ment has concentrated on how individuals adopt the standards 
of right and wrong that are laid down by their culture. The 
major concern has been with the internal aspects of sociali­
zation as a moralizing process and centered on the questions 
regarding the internalization of society's values and mores. 
In the descriptive sense, socialization is a class name for 
all the behaviors of the child that concern other people, 
directly or indirectly. If a child is a delinquent, for 
example, a fault in socialization is said to be present. If 
he is withdrawn or unpopular, he is considered to be inade­
quately socialized. If a little boy plays exclusively with 
little girls, his socialization is questioned. The list of 
behaviors and attributes included under socialization is as 
extensive as the possible range of social relations and char­
acteristics that go into the product (Reese & Lipsitt, 1970). 
According to psychoanalytic theory (Freud, 1949)/ the 
child is controlled by inborn primitive drives which he is 
forced to give up because of parental discipline. Immoral 
behavior was said to be motivated by unconscious needs for 
punishment and blame (Bijou, 1975). Cognitive-developmental 
theory (Kohlerg, 1963: Piaget, 1932) assumed that external 
rules became transformed into internal principles through 
cognitive processes. Accordingly, the child went through' 
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the stages of heterony (rules are laid down by adults), equal­
ity (rewards and punishment are distributed equally and 
punishment is related to misdeeds), and equity (judgments 
are based on real situations)(Bijou, 1975). Social learning 
theory (Bandura & Walters, 1963; Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967; 
Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957) stressed child-rearing prac­
tices as morality antecedents. 
The expectations are that punishment given by parents 
under certain conditions will bring about feelings of 
anxiety and will inhibit wrongdoing quite independent 
of whether, in the current situatL on, the child is 
punished. Avoidance and inhibition learned in the 
home should be generalized to any and every situation 
outside even when there is no supervision of the child. 
Thus the conscious build-up through reward and punish­
ment will be taken into all situations. (Lovell, 1971, 
p. 102) 
The development of conscience, as evidenced by guilt, has 
been presumed to reflect the internalization of moral standards; 
but the child-rearing antecedents of guilt have not been 
fully established. Henry and Short (1954) suggested that 
internalization of parental characteristics as evidenced in 
guilt was most likely to occur when the disciplining parent 
was also perceived as a source of affection. King and Henry 
(1955) found that males who reported their mothers as dominant 
in discipline showed a cardiovascular reaction under stress 
characteristic of guilt. 
Social learning theory generated research which attempted 
to relate child-rearing practices to moral development (Hoff­
man, 1970). Several of these studies found correlations 
between guilt, one of the indices of morality, and 
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childrearing practices (Allinsmith, 19607 Allinsmith & 
Greening, 1955; MacKinnon, 1938; Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 
1957; Whiting, 1954). Hoffman (1975a) reviewed the research 
on child-rearing antecedents of guilt and found support for 
the theory that moral orientation, measured by high guilt, 
was associated with the mother's frequent use of inductive 
techniques. These techniques involved pointing out to the 
child the consequences of his behavior on others. Other 
researchers (Allinsmith, I960; MacKinnon, 1938; Whiting, 
1954) also found a relationship between high guilt in the 
child and his mother's use of induction, or reasoning. The 
use of induction techniques to foster moral development has 
not, however, been experimentally tested. 
The Psychoanalytic Theory of Moral Development 
According to psychoanalytic theory, morality is primar­
ily motivational, emotional, and unconscious. "Moral standards 
are largely unconscious products of powerful irrational motives 
and are based on the need to keep antisocial impulses from 
becoming conscious awareness" (Hoffman, 1970, p. 261). The 
moral individual wrestled with the biological drives of the 
id# was denied biological fulfillment, and solved his prob­
lems by incorporating his view of parental attitudes as his 
own. The introjected parent was always, to a large extent, 
the fantasy product of the child who felt guilty about his 
sexual inclination toward that parent (Munroe, 1955). The 
conscience, formed as a resolution of the oedipal complex, 
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became strengthened by the admonitioning of the adult and 
formed the internal control of impulse necessary for adequate 
social function. The child who was deprived of an adequate 
parental figure would tend to remain at the narcissistic 
level. This lack of a person to identify with would produce 
a conscience-less individual who loved only himself. 
In psychoanalytic theory the superego served as the 
vehicle for the conscience. It developed as an aftermath of 
the oedipus complex and dealt with the ego as a strict father 
would deal with his child. When the ego and superego conflic­
ted, the superego served as pressure upon the ego, and the 
child felt guilty. Social stability was thus achieved, since 
the child controlled his sexual and aggressive impulses 
(Freud, 1949). 
According to Freud (1949), girls did not resolve the 
oedipus complex quickly and dramatically, and therefore did 
not identify with parents as fully as boys did. This meant 
that girls had less internalized moral structures. This 
theory was contradicted by research studies which indicated 
that girls had more highly internalized moral structures than 
boys (Hoffman, 1975a). 
Ausubel and Sullivan (1970) disagreed with Freud's emphasis 
on the superego. They believed that moral development was synon­
ymous with ego development and that there was no necessity 
for considering a separate layer of the personality such as 
the Freudian superego. 
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The potential for guilt, according to psychoanalytic 
theory, originated with the beginning of human history, in the 
archaic structure of man's psyche (Puiynski, 1975). Bad 
deeds were then the result of the primitive existence of 
guilt. The natural moral order was passed down through 
antiquity, and moral maturity was a gradual transition from 
heterony to autonomy. Moral autonomy was the pinnacle of the 
integrated hierarchy of moral values. The child passed 
gradually through the phases of dependence on important 
adults and peers and became self-sufficient and independent. 
A positive emotional link between child and parent facilitated 
moral development. Rewarding through love and punishing through 
depriving the child of love was considered more important 
than material awards or physical punishment in his moral 
development. The socially conditioned dynamic development 
of the correct personality of the human being was a process 
of gradual transition from a system of external control to 
internal control as the child identified with the parent and 
accepted the parents' standards of conduct as his own, and as 
introjection (taking the thought or feeling of someone else 
as one's own) occurred (Izard, 1977). 
The Cognitive-Developmental Theory 
of Moral Development 
The cognitive-developmental approach to moral development 
is nativistic and assumes that the child is a moral philoso­
pher (Kohlberg, 1963). External rules become transformed 
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into internal principles through cognitive processes which 
evolve developmentally in stages (Bijou, 1975). Research 
generated by the cognitive-developmental approach focused on 
the development of moral judgment, determined by analyzing 
children's responses to stories involving ambiguous moral 
situations. Moral judgment was emphasized, rather than moral 
behavior. 
The cognitive-developmental approach was first postu­
lated by John Dewey (1909). Three levels of moral development 
were outlined: pre-moral, conventional, and autonomous. The 
premoral individual was primarily a biological-impulse orga­
nism, the conventional level individual accepted the standards 
of the group, while the person at the autonomous level guided 
his conduct by thinking and judgment. Whereas Dewey's think­
ing about moral stages was theoretical, Jean Piaget made the 
first effort to define stages of moral reasoning in children 
through observation (Kohlberg, 1975). The essence of morality, 
according to Piaget, included both the individual's respect 
for the rules of social order and his sense of judgment 
(Hoffman, 1970). The sense of justice was investigated by 
telling stories about persons who committed transgressions 
and asking children to evaluate the act according to 
the degree of "wrongness." Prom these procedures, Piaget 
delineated two broad stages of moral development. In the 
first stage, moral realism, the child complied with rules 
and viewed behavior as totally wrong or totally right. He 
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believed in imminent justice and judged an act by the magni­
tude of its consequences. In the latter stage, autonomous 
morality, the child perceived rules as modifiable in response 
to human need. According to Piaget, both maturation and 
experience were essential in the transition from one stage 
to the next. Moral reasoning could be developed only by 
cooperation and genuine intellectual changes on the part of 
children. Changes in the child's behavior could come about 
only through time, although it was not time itself but 
rather the activities of the child in interaction with his 
* * 
environment that led to new structuring of the mental organi­
zation (Piaget, 1970). Piaget suggested that role-taking 
experiences which produced'cognitive disequilibrium were major 
contributors to moral internalization. Glassco, Milgram, 
and Youniss (1970) found that children, exposed to an adult 
model who used more mature criteria of intentions, shifted 
their verbal responses toward that of the model. Although 
this exposure to the adult model who assigned greater weight 
to intentions may have produced cognitive disequilibrium 
which the subjects reduced by changing their views, the 
findings did not support the cognitive-development assump­
tion of directional change. A model who stressed consequences 
over intentions, a lower-level cognition, would also be 
expected to produce cognitive disequilibrium (Hoffman, 1977). 
While Piaget (1932) stressed the impox-tance of peer 
interaction, it was also made clear that the parent's 
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child-rearing practices also played a role in moral develop­
ment. 
In order to remove all traces of moral realism, one 
must place oneself on the child's own level, and give 
him a feeling of equality by laying stress on one's 
own deficiencies. In the sphere of clumsiness and 
untidiness in general (putting away toys, personal 
cleanliness, etc.), in short in all the multifarious 
obligations that are so secondary for moral theory but 
so all-important in daily life (perhaps nine-tenths of 
the commands given to children relate to these material 
questions) it is quite easy to draw attention to one's 
own difficulties, even one's own blunders, and to point 
out their consequences, thus creating an atmosphere 
of mutual help and understanding. In this way the 
child will find himself in the presence, not of a sys­
tem of commands requiring ritualistic and external obed­
ience, but of a system of social relations such that 
everyone does his best to obey the same obligations, 
and does so out of mutual respect. (pp. 133-134) 
Research findings on age trends in moral development 
provided considerable support for Piaget's theory that the 
child's morality level was related to his developmental level 
of reasoning (Grinder, 1964? Liu, 1950: Whiteman & Hosier, 
1964). Havighurst and Neugarten (1955), however, in an 
extended study of several Indian tribes, found evidence 
against the universality of Piaget's stages. Bandura and 
McDonald (1963) attempted to demonstrate that Piaget's (1948) 
sequence of moral development changes was a function of 
reinforcement and imitative learning. Children were assigned 
to stages in terms of responses to paired story acts, 
one a well-intentioned act resulting in considerable damage 
and the other a maliciously motivated act which resulted in 
very little damage. The experimental subjects then observed 
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adult models who were reinforced when they expressed judg­
ment opposite to the child's orientation. The child's own 
responses were reinforced when they ran counter to his 
dominant mode. The posttest used different stories, adding 
methodological strength to the study. The findings were 
that children were influenced to judge on the orientation mode 
opposite to their initial one. Bandura and McDonald concluded 
that this cast doubt on the validity of a developmental 
stage theory of morality. The weakness in this study was 
that the posttest was given immediately after the experimental 
treatment and that there was no follow-up test. Duration 
over time was considered by Piaget to distinguish between 
cognitive structures and superficially learned responses. 
In recent years, Piaget's theories on moral development 
have been intensively scrutinized. Magowan and Lee (1970) 
investigated possible shortcomings in the story methodology. 
It was found that more immanent justice responses were made 
to familiar stories. Medinnus (1959) re-examined the problem 
of immanent justice in a study of 240 children aged six to 
twelve, and concluded that a child's expressed belief in 
immanent justice was a function of the meaningfulness of the 
story described, the presence or absence of rational alterna­
tive explanations, and the range of the child's experiences. 
Others (Dennis, 1943: Durkin, 1959; MacRae, 1954) had similar 
findings. The evidence strongly demonstrated the presence 
of situation-specific responses to Piagetian moral judgment 
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stories. Siegal (1975) offered the theory that these situa-
tion-specific responses represented problems in learning 
moral language, as the child often appeared to speak in self-
contradictions . 
In 1955 Kohlberg began to redefine and validate Piaget's 
stages of moral development. His aim was to retain the 
best of Piaget1s schema and fit it into a more logically 
consistent framework. Kohlberg (1974) studied the same group 
of 75 boys from early adolescence through young manhood, and 
additionally, explored moral development in Great Britain, 
Canada, Taiwan, Mexico, and Turkey. The typology developed 
contained three levels of moral thinking, each level divided 
into two stages. The six stages, summarized, are as follows: 
1. Obey rules to avoid punishment. 
2. Conform to obtain rewards, have favors returned, 
and so forth. 
3. Conform to avoid disapproval, dislike by other. 
4. Conform to avoid censure by legitimate authorities 
and resultant guilt. 
5. Conform to maintain the respect of the impartial 
spectator judging in terms of community welfare. 
6. Conform to avoid self-condemnation. (Kohlberg, 1963, 
pp. 13-14) 
A more complete definition of Kohlberg1s moral stages is 
placed in Appendix A. 
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Kohlberg's (19 63) stages of moral development implied 
that stages are organized systems of thought, individuals 
are consistent in level of moral judgment, the stages form 
an invariant sequence, and that while thinking at a higher 
level includes within it lower-stage thinking, there is a 
tendency for an individual to function at or prefer the 
highest stage available. Certain seemingly incompatible 
factors, such as low correlations found between maturity of 
moral judgment and IQ, were given less credence by Kohlberg 
than the philosophical logic that moral reasoning is clearly 
reasoning and advanced moral reasoning depends upon advanced 
logical reasoning (Stanton, 1976). Mature moral judgment 
was deemed to be a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for mature moral action. Krebs (1968) suggested that sixth-
grade children at stages five and six resisted temptation 
to a greater extent than children at stages three and four. 
The conclusion was that the person who understood justice 
was more likely to practice it. 
A major difference between Piaget1s and Kohlberg's moral 
stages was the stronger emphasis by Kohlberg on the natural 
outgrowth of cognitive development (Hoffman, 1970). Accord­
ing to Kohlberg, participation in groups provided the indi­
vidual with experience in taking alternate roles, thereby 
receiving a broader social perspective: but the particular 
authority to which he responds is determined by the child's 
comprehension of who is deemed to be the most legitimate 
30 
authority. This comprehension depends on the specific point 
of the child's cognitive development. 
Kohlberg's stage theory was experimentally tested by 
Turiel (1966), using 47 seventh-grade boys. These subjects 
were assigned stage positions based on their responses to six 
of Kohlberg's stories about individuals in moral dilemmas. 
The subjects assigned to the experimental group were presented 
three different Kohlberg stories, instructed to take the role 
of the central figure in each story, and seek advice from the 
experimenter. The experimenter's advice consisted of argu­
ments either one or two stages above or one stage below the 
subject's prior stage rating. When the subjects were retested 
a week later, it was found that although the experimental 
group did not shift to a significantly greater degree than 
the control group which had experienced no treatment, the 
net shift (experimental group minus control group) was greater 
for the +1 than the -1 group. The tentative conclusion was 
that Kohlberg's stages two, three, and four, the ones used in 
this study, were successive stages of cognitive levels and 
that children presented with statements at different moral 
levels tended to prefer those above rather than those below 
their own level. A weakness in the study design was that 
Kohlberg's moral judgment interview, which contained nine 
hypothetical conflict stories, was used as both pre- and post-
test. 
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There is more agreement on Kohlberg1s three levels 
of thought (preconventional, conventional, and post-conven-
tional) than on the specific six stages (Hall & Davis, 1975). 
Kurtines and Greif (1974) pointed out that in Kohlberg's 
longitudinal study, there were few significant changes in 
moral judgment over time, and that there was no evidence 
that the students passed through the stages in a fixed order. 
College students often obtained lower scores than when they 
were in high school. It was also suggested that there were 
some anomalies in research relating Kohlerg1s stages to overt 
behavior. Stage three characterized delinquents in one 
study and social conformists in another. Holstein (1976) 
found evidence against the expected stepwise progression. 
Kohlberg's research was only found to have demonstrated 
irreversibility and invariance in stages two, three, and 
four (Simpson, 1974). Another difficulty with Kohlberg's 
model was that it had not clarified whether the stages of 
moral development were strictly consecutive (a new mode of 
thought leaving behind the previous modes) or cumulative (the 
attainment of a new stage involving a continuation of the 
previous modes of thought) (Hall & Davis, 1975). Kohlberg's 
earlier views suggested that the stages were consecutive 
and mutually exclusive, but this was implied more than demon­
strated. Williams and Williams (1970) held that the highest 
level of moral thought was one in which the individual had 
different and simultaneously existing modes of thought as 
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they related to any given situation; but objective, suppor­
tive research was lacking. 
Kohlberg's criterion for assessment was attacked by 
Stanton, (1976, p. 614) who stated: 
Kohlberg's typology and theoretical views are based on 
studies in which the moral dilemmas used were far 
removed from the reality of his subjects1 experience 
as, for example, in questions relating to a story in 
which a man stole drugs to save the life of his wife 
(Kohlberg, 1963). This rather extreme dilemma, . . . 
would appear to place the emphasis on assessing intel­
lectual ability required to interpret complex rela­
tionships rather than the quality of thinking related 
to moral judgments in real life. 
In a lengthy criticism of Kohlberg's work and his claim 
for universality, Simpson (1974) suggested that his assumptions 
were ethnocentric and culturally biased. Research by Witkin 
(1974) and Hsu (1961) concurred that subculture may influence 
expectations and judgments in many ways. The greatest dis­
crepancies in Kohlberg's theory were noted in the formulation 
of stages and phases beyond the onset of adolescence. Oth­
ers, however, (Bull, 1969; Kay, 1968), found a very general 
agreement on the nature of the sequence of stages. 
Kohlberg's theory has provided guidelines for new 
efforts in moral education. Young inmates in a New England 
reformatory participated in an experiment on ethics (San­
born, 1971). The subjects were operating primarily at 
Stages one and two when the experiment began. Through open 
discussions, the inmates were exposed to more sophisticated 
moral concepts. As the experiment: progressed, most of tho 
subjects moved into stage four. 
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Although Kohlberg believed moral development to be a 
function of maturation facilitated by age-related experi­
ences , leaving the occurrence of those age-related experi­
ences to chance was not suggested. A general prescription 
for moral education that resembles programmed learning (Kohl­
berg, 1966) was advanced. Moral education, it was stated, 
should be directed toward bringing children through the stage 
of cognitive development step by step. Children should be 
given opportunities for more advancement in moral development 
(Kohlberg, 1969). Holstein (1970) offered support for this 
theory. Upper-middle-class parents at a principled level 
tended to have children who participated in moral discussion 
and were more advanced in moral development than those of 
parents who did not provide such opportunities for their 
children. However, in a review article by Kurtines and 
Greif (1974), much criticism was leveled against Kohlberg's 
theory and assessment of moral judgments. "In general, 
neither the cross-sectional, longitudinal nor sex difference 
data support the notion of an invariant developmental 
sequence" (p. 467). Holstein's (1972) three-year longitud­
inal study of moral development found no sequential progres­
sion from one stage to the next. Moreover, for the adults, 
as well as 16-year-olds, the most frequently occurring model 
response was stage three and four. 
Kurtines and Greif (1974) pointed out measurement prob­
lems in scoring Kohlberg1s dilemmas, and expressed concern 
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about the lack of data supporting a correlation between moral 
judgment and moral behavior at various levels of development. 
They concluded by stating: 
It is difficult to make a definitive statement about 
the ability of Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental 
model of moral development. After 15 years of 
research, the general lack of evidence for the model 
is suggestive. The possibility remains that the 
stages do reflect actual development and that the 
general lack of evidence reflects the inadequacy of 
the measuring device. . . we can conclude that the 
value of the model remains to be demonstrated. 
(p. 469) 
The Social Learning Theory of Moral Development 
Social learning theorists (Bandura & Walters, 1963; Hoff­
man & Saltzstein, 1967j Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957) stressed 
the motivational and emotional components of morality. As a 
theory, it differed from psychoanalysis in the assumptions 
made concerning the processes of internalization of moral 
values. Lovell (1971) summarized the social learning theory 
position: 
The expectations are that punishment given by parents 
under certain conditions will bring about feelings of 
anxiety and will inhibit wrongdoing quite independent 
of whether, in the current situation, the child is pun­
ished. Avoidance and inhibition learned in the home 
should be generalizable to any and every situation 
outside even when there is no supervision of the child. 
Thus the conscious build-up through reward and punish­
ment will be taken into all situations. (p. 102) 
This position led to research which attempted to corre­
late5 parental practices with personality characteristics of 
children (Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957) and other research 
which attempted to relate child-rearing categories (as power 
35 
assertion, love withdrawal, induction, and affection) to 
various indicators of conscience, such as guilt and resistance 
to temptation (Bijou, 1975). Most of these studies have been 
criticized because parental practices were determined by inter­
views and questionnaires (Yarrow, Campbell, & Burton, 1968), 
and because the laboratory procedures used operational 
rather than functional definition of concepts. 
Behavioral research has concerned itself, not with 
internalized constructs that acted in the individual as med­
iators in self-discipline, but rather with environmental 
contingencies that altered behavior in the "desired" direc­
tion. According to Skinner (1953) self-controlling behavior 
in moral behavior comes into play when a response produces 
conflicting consequences. 
The immediate and remote consequences of most acts are 
brought about by combinations of the physical environ­
ment. In moral self-controlling behavior, however, 
the long range contingencies are for the most part 
mediated by the social environment. (Bijou, 1975, 
p. 16) 
Self-controlling behavior, then, was perceived as a chain 
of events that originated in the environment and was either 
strengthened or weakened by the environment (Skinner, 1969). 
Thoresen and Mahoney (1974) suggested teaching a child to 
engage in self-controlling behaviors by training him to 
respond to, observe, or discriminate his own behavior; to 
identify the conditions that precede and follow the behavior: 
and to engage in behavior that altered one or both of these 
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contextual conditions. Bijou (1975, p. 25) outlined a pro­
cedure for parents to use in teaching initial moral behavior. 
The approach contained the following five steps: 
(1) Specify the goals of moral training. 
(2) Begin training at a realistic level. 
(3) Arrange conditions to expedite learning the target 
moral behavior. 
(4) Monitor progress and alter the procedures and 
goals as changes appear to be necessary, and 
(5) Maintain the acquired behavior. 
Bijou's functional approach to the teaching of moral behaviors 
would account for situation specific moral behavior such as 
that noted in the classic Hartshorne and May (1930) study. 
It also would explain the appearance of mature moral behavior 
in children too young to satisfy that criterion through the 
cognitive-developmental approach. It was deficient in 
accounting for those behaviors judged universally moral, 
which present no evidence of having been taught. 
One of the legacies of Freud, and the sociologist 
Durkheim as well, is the assumption now prevalent among 
social scientists that the individual does not go through 
life viewing society's central norms as externally and 
coercively imposed pressures to which he must submit. 
(Hoffman, 1970, p. 262) 
The major concept in most moral development research 
has been the internalization of socially sanctioned standards 
of behavior, but theorists have disagreed on which socializa­
tion experiences are most likely to foster this internaliza­
tion process. Several writers (Bandra & Walters, 1963; 
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Brim, 1968; Campbell, 1964) noted that internalization of 
control may merely reflect the norms of an absent reference 
group. Hoffman (1970, p. 264) stated that if 
the behavior was based on the actor's positive atti­
tude toward the reference figure ... or concern 
about hurting or disappointing him—without regard 
for punitive consequences—then the behavior may be 
appropriately classed as internalized. 
The individual who had internalized control, then, accepted 
society's standard as an obligation to himself. His motives 
were to avoid self-condemnation and guilt. This concept of 
internalization bypassed the cognitive-developmental theory of 
moral reasoning, but bridged psychoanalytic and learning theory 
on the variables of identification, modeling, and conditioning 
and the elevation of the role of the parent in the internali­
zation process. It is especially similar to an individual's 
controlling behavior which Skinner (1953) believed came 
about when a response produced conflicting consequences. 
Certain parallels were drawn between the psychoanalytic 
concept "castration anxiety" and social learning theory's 
parental discipline technique of love-withdrawal, both of 
which were viewed as producing first fear in the child, then 
conformity behavior through identification, an aspect of 
moral internalization (Mowrer, 1952). 
For several years, psychologists have viewed the kind 
of responses that an individual made to temptation as one of 
the indices of moral internalization (Fonichel, 1945; Redl 
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& Wineman, 1951; Sears, Maccoby & Levin, 1957). Social 
learning theorists have steered away from the construct moral 
internalization and centered on temptation behaviors, leav­
ing the connection between the two variables to the theoreti­
cians. Grinder's (1961) definition of temptation was based 
upon the elements of the temptation situation itself. It 
was stated that 
. . . a state of temptation exists for an individual 
when the addition or presence of a rewarding stimulus 
(incentive) increases the probability of a class of 
responses which is forbidden because of its incompati­
bility (conflict) with some socially expected behavior, 
(p. 680). 
Temptation, then, was a predecision-type conflict situation 
where an individual, free from danger of detection, must 
choose between a positive incentive and conformity to learned 
role behavior. Grinder designed a beanbag and a ray-gun game 
situation to assess temptation to transgress. Research by 
Burton, Maccoby, and Allinsmith (1961) indicated the pro­
cedures were successful. The findings in this study/ however, 
were puzzling. Resistance to temptation was found to be neg­
atively related to other interview measures of conscience, 
and it was suggested that resistance to temptation and guilt 
should be studied as distinct phenomena and not considered 
as alternate measures of internalized standards. 
In a 1967 study, Hoffman and Saltzstein assessed seventh-
grade children on several dimensions of moral development 
and compared them with parental discipline techniques coded 
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into three categories of power assertion, love withdrawal, 
and induction. This study challenged the hypothesis which 
stemmed from psychoanalytic and learning theories that 
anxiety over loss of love was the necessary motivational 
basis for moral development. It was found that the use of 
induction, a technique in which the parent pointed out the 
painful consequences of the child's act for the parent or 
other, was consistently associated with advanced moral devel­
opment. One of the indices used as measurement of moral 
development was guilt. 
The Induction Method and Moral Internalization 
Research studies relating internalization of moral 
values and the capacity for guilt to parental practices char­
acteristically divided parental discipline techniques into 
two categories: power assertion (physical punishment and 
material deprivation) and nonpower assertion (love-oriented 
discipline). Although the differential effects of these two 
methods were frequently discussed (Allinsmith & Greening, 
1955; Hill, 1960; Sears, Maccoby, & Levin, 1957), Aronfreed*s 
(1968) belief that the major differentiating variable was 
the information communicated by nonpower assertion tech­
niques became a strong inducement to subdivide the nonpower 
assertion category and concentrate on this component. Hoffman 
and Saltzstein (1967) thus subdivided the nonpower asser­
tion category into induction and love-withdrawal. In love-
withdrawal, the parent gave direct but nonphysical expression 
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to "his anger or disapproval of the child for engaging in the 
behavior. In induction, the parent pointed out the painful 
consequences of the child's act for the parent or for others. 
It was Hoffman's (1963) belief that this technique, supply­
ing to the child knowledge that his actions caused pain to 
others, relied on empathy and thus provided a powerful emo­
tional and cognitive support for development of moral controls. 
Martin (1975) described the inductive technique also as hav­
ing a cognitive and an affective component. The cognitive 
component helped the child learn specific rules or limits 
for behavior, understand the reasons for such rules and antic­
ipate the consequences for breaking such rules. Baumrind 
(1970), Parke (1969), and Pikas (1961) found that parents who 
used reason to legitimate their directives were more potent 
models and reinforcing agents than parents who did not encour­
age verbal exchange. 
The affective component included an actual or implied 
threat of withdrawal of love, contingent upon the enactment 
of undesired behaviors. It made the child feel bad for 
behavior that hurt parents or others. It was hypothesized 
that if transgressions were followed in induction, the 
child would learn that the important part of transgressions 
consisted of the harm done to others (Hoffman & Saltzstein, 
1967). It is possible that only inductions can arouse the 
need for love to an optimal degree, because the threat of 
love withdrawal implicit in inductions is relatively mild. 
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Inductions are less likely to disrupt the general affective 
relationship with the parent. 
Yarrow and Waxier (1977) developed a research interest 
in how concern for others, or empathy, was born and bred* 
Their subjects were 128 children, ages 10 months to 7 years. 
The first study focused on the child's emerging sensitivi­
ties to affective events, such as a parent's or child's anger, 
pain, or joy. The second and third studies began with three-
year-old children and investigated the development and rela­
tions of perspective-taking skills and prosocial behavior. 
They found that young children were often finely discriminat­
ing and responsive to others' needs, as evidenced by crying, 
holding hands over their ears, comforting a distraught parent 
or hitting the parent perceived the guilty one. The chil­
dren's abilities to deal with another's perspective on the 
perceptual and cognitive tasks increased with age, the most 
substantial jump occurring between four and one-half and 
five years of age, but there was no overall relation between 
perspective-taking abilities and prosocial intervention. 
The researchers ventured the hypothesis that aggressions 
experienced may contribute to the development of sensitivity 
to feelings. In other words, direct learning experiences 
may be essential to the development of prosocial behaviors, 
whereas empathetic feeling may be more directly related to 
maturation. 
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Chandler (1973) demonstrated that certain empathetic 
perspective-taking skills could be taught, and suggested the 
utility of attempting to understand delinquent youth in 
terms of age-inappropriate egocentral thought. Other inves­
tigators (Feffer, 1970; Sarbin, 1954; Thompson, 1968) have 
found support for this view that prosocial behavior was 
related to the development of age-appropriate perspective-
taking skills. Piaget and Inhelder (1956) and Looft (1972) 
found the social judgments of young children to be limited 
by egocentric thought. 
Of the three types of parental discipline (love-
withdrawal, power-assertion, and induction) frequently 
studied as a factor in the child's moral development (Hoffman 
& Saltzstein, 1967), induction seemed more capable of enlist­
ing the child's natural proclivities for empathy in the 
struggle to control his impulses. Induction directs the 
child's attention to the other's pain, which should elicit 
an empathic response and also communicate to the child 
that he caused the pain. This combination of empathy and 
awareness of being the causal agent should produce a response 
having both cognitive and affective properties. "The child 
is thus gradually enabled to pick out on his own, without 
help from others, the effects of his behavior, and to react 
with an internally based sense of guilt" (Hoffman & Saltz-
stein, 1967, p. 55). 
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Previous arguments that the child below the age of six 
was not capable of empathic thought have been weakened by 
recent research. Piaget's famous three-mountain landscape 
task, on which children below six years of age typically made 
the egocentric error of attributing their own viewpoint to a 
doll situated in various locations around the landscape/ was 
interpreted as suggesting severe limitations for the young 
child's empathetic or role-taking abilities (Hoffman, 1977). 
Ambron and Irwin (1975) studied 34 kindergarten children and 
38 second-grade children on dimensions of role-taking and 
moral judgment. A significant correlation between role-
taking and moral judgment was found. Seven-year-olds had 
significantly higher scores on role-taking than the five-year-
olds. Other studies, however, have suggested that Piaget's 
original task, with its spatial-perceptual requirement, was 
a faulty method for measuring the role-taking competence of 
young subjects (Borke, 1975). Additionally, three-year-olds 
made very few errors when the display contained familiar toys 
and a verbal response was not required. Even two-year-olds 
were observed to turn a picture toward another person who 
asked to see it. One and two-day-old infants were found to 
cry in response to the sound of another infant's cry (Simner, 
1971). 
Empathy has been studied as unfolding through a series 
of developmental stages. 
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Empathy is seen as having an affective component that 
is given increasingly complex meaning as the child 
progresses through the four phases in the development 
of a cognitive sense of the other. ... Thus the 
infant's empathetic response to another's distress 
includes no awareness of who is actually in distress. 
With "person permanence," this awareness exists but 
the other's inner states are unknown and assumed to be 
the same as one's own. With role-taking development, 
empathy becomes an increasingly veridical response 
to the other's inner states in the situation. (Hoffman, 
1977, p. 300) 
Empathy, thus, was viewed as a vital part of the pro­
cess of moral internalization. The most recent theoretical 
account of how induction fosters internalization was sum­
marized by Hoffman (1977): 
. . .  ( a )  M o s t  t e c h n i q u e s  h a v e  s o m e  p o w e r - a s s e r t i v e ,  
love-withdrawing, and inductive properties. (b) The 
first two comprise the motive arousal component which 
is necessary to get the child to stop what he is doing 
and attend. (c) Having attended, the child will often 
be influenced cognitively, and affectively (through 
empathy arousal) by the information contained in the 
inductive component and thus experience a reduced sense 
of opposition between his desires and external demands, 
(d) Too little arousal and the child may ignore the 
parent; too much and the resulting fear or resentment 
may prevent effective processing of the inductive 
content, thus perpetuating the felt opposition between 
desires and demands. Inductions ordinarily achieve 
the best balance and are therefore most effective in the 
discipline encounter. Furthermore, in keeping with 
recent developmental research on memory ... the child 
may be expected over time to remember the ideas commun­
icated in inductions but to forget that they originated 
with the parent. With no external agent to whom to 
attribute these ideas, he may then be expected to 
attribute them to himself. (p. 301) 
The Phenomenon of Guilt 
Recent years have seen the accumulation of a body of 
research utilizing capacity for guilt as a criterion for 
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measuring internalization of moral values (Hoffman & Saltz-
stein, 1967). The concept of the guilt feeling as an impor­
tant psychological phenomenon was introduced into scientific 
scholarship by Freud and the followers of his psychoanalytic 
concepts (Freud, 1964). Over the years, the various schools 
of psychology have argued the question of the significance 
of the experience of guilt for the correct development of the 
personality of the human being. Some adherents to classical 
psychoanalysis defined guilt as a conflict between the ego and 
superego (Lewis, 1971; Piers & Singer, 1953), but psychologists 
representing the neo-Freudians or newer directions of dynamic 
psychiatry are of divided opinions. Ausubel (1958) defined 
the guilt feeling as a specific type of negative assessment 
of one's self in which shame, self-persecution, grief, and a 
lowered feeling of respect for one1s self all have their 
part. Ausubel, then, considered guilt as specifically an ego 
problem. 
Psychoanalysis sought the sources of guilt in the begin­
nings of human history, in the archaic structure of man's psyche. 
Existential philosophy which proceeded from the ontological percep­
tion of the genesis of guilt, posited that the experience of guilt 
appeared at the moment of mankind's birth and is connected with 
the individual's failure to reach his fullest potential (Puiyn-
ski, 1975). Yap (1965), elaborating on this concept, emphasized 
that guilt was not the result of bad deeds, but the precursor 
of bad deeds. Puiynski (1975) suggested that guilt had not 
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only an existential character but also a genetical character. 
The concept of guilt as learned, however, has enjoyed greater 
acceptance (Whiting & Child, 1953). In secular life, it was 
assumed that the correct process of socializing the individual 
was based on the gradual development of the personality, 
with attainment of maturity in the spheres of emotions, per­
ception, and aspirations. 
Puiynski (1975), in a theoretical treatise, summarized 
the Freudian explanation of the development of guilt. This 
treatise indicated that the young infant, totally dependent, 
received satisfaction of his basic needs from his parents. 
A condition of the satisfaction of the need for dependence 
was the adaptation of the child to the demands and prohibi­
tions of the parents. This was obtained by means of rewarding 
through love and punishing by depriving the child of love. 
The basic condition of proper development was a mutual posi­
tive link between the child and his parents. Threat of loss 
of parental love caused the child to develop a feeling of 
guilt. Moral internalization, through identifcation with 
the parent, was more intensive the younger the child. This 
socially conditioned dynamic development of the correct 
personality was a process of gradual transition from a sys­
tem of external control to a system of internal control. The 
feeling of guilt was integrally related to the feeling of 
responsibility. Without a feeling of responsibility, there 
would be no guilt. The absence of responsibility is generally 
considered as a manifestation of emotional immaturity. 
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Bronfenbrenner (1968) noted that Russian children, 
reared in a collective atmosphere, developed guilt feelings 
over any desire to rebel. This was accomplished by the 
love-withdrawal pattern of discipline. Great emphasis was 
given to the development of social morality: obedience and 
self-discipline. Since each child's status depended in part 
on the status of his collective, it was in each child's self-
interest to assume responsibility for his neighbor. There 
was a pattern of continuity between the discipline used by 
the parent and that used by the collective. In essence, the 
system said that the collective—like Mother—would not love 
you unless you behaved as it required you to do. 
In examining the etiology of the guilt feeling, attention 
must be drawn to the possible need for punishment. Although 
Horney (1939) separated the guilt feeling from a need for 
punishment, empirical observations rather confirmed the 
position of those researchers who treated both elements as 
component parts of one experience (Puiynski, 1975). The 
experience was said to occur early in childhood, resulting 
in the learned sequence of guilt, punishment, and forgiveness. 
The child learned that condemnation does not last forever, 
but may be redeemed through punishment. Therefore, a condi­
tion of the internalization of moral values was not only a 
fear of punishment but also a desire for forgiveness. Reli­
gions introduced synonymous terms: the immoral deed was 
equated with sin and the feeling of guilt was equated with 
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the feeling of sinfulness. The need for punishment was equated 
with the feeling of sinfulness. The need for punishment was 
equated with the need for penitence, which reduced the feeling 
of guilt and brought the sinner psychic relief (Benedict, 
1946). Mowrer (1961) also maintained that discipline and 
punishment were essential in the development of guilt and 
that confession and expiation were essential in the main­
tenance of mental health when one had committed a misdeed. 
Thus guilt was looked upon as a positive sign of a person's 
socialization. Reese and Lipsett (1970) termed guilt as the 
most commonly agreed upon criterion behavior from which moral 
or conscience identification is inferred. Achenbach (1966) 
found that internalized guilt correlated with fewer social 
problems and better school performance in children. And the 
Psychology Encyclopedia (197 3) stated that, "Failure to have 
guilt feelings is a mark of the antisocial person who has a 
weak conscience and who lives at odds with the customs and 
laws of society" (p. 110). Izard (1977) described guilt as 
". . . the emotion most essential to the development of the 
affective-cognitive structures of conscience and the affective-
cognitive-action patterns of moral behavior" (p. 421). 
Not all psychologists agreed that guilt was a positive 
variable. Ellis (1962) accepted that there is such a thing 
as human wrongdoing and that some standard is necessary for 
social group living. A standard sustained by incul­
cating in people a sense of guilt was rejected. 
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It was believed that self-blame and a sense of worthlessness 
led to emotional disturbance. Ellis' rational psychotherapy 
helped the person from this syllogism: 
(a) Wrongdoing is self- or society-defeating; 
(b) I have made a mistake or committed a wrong act; 
(c) Therefore, I'd better stop being self-defeating 
by acknowledging my wrong doing and take consid­
erable time and effort to work at not repeating it, 
so that eventually I'll become a less frequent 
wrongdoer. (1962, pp. 144-145) 
Although Ellis did not accept guilt as a prerequisite to 
socialization as did others with psychoanalytic background, 
he agreed with their acceptance of a biologically based 
guilt. 
Like the tendency to blame others, the propensity to 
blame oneself (or be guilty) may also in part be 
biologically based. This is not to deny that much or 
most of the intense guilt of men and women is acquired 
in the course of their early upbringing; for it would 
certainly seem to be. But here again we must suspect 
that if virtually all humans in all parts of the civ­
ilized and uncivilized world are intensely guilty or 
ashamed of many things they do, man must somehow be the 
kind of animal who, par excellence, is quilt-inducible. 
(1962, p. 398) 
Miller and Swanson (1960) referred to this phenomenon as 
each generation 's re-experiencing man's fall from grace; and 
in differential emotions theory guilt is considered a funda­
mental emotion which emerged like other fundamental emotions, 
through evolutionary-biological processes (Izard, 1977). 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1971), in agreement with differential 
emotions theory (Izard, 1977) and the psychoanalytic school 
(Rickman, 1957), argued that there is a genetic basis for 
the development of a sense of personal responsibility and 
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guilt. Ausubel (1955) suggested that the biogenetic mechanism 
for guilt was so basically human that it would develop in 
all cultures if conditions were even minimally favorable. 
The single most important basis for the development of 
conscience and guilt, according to Ausubel, was the powerful 
need for parents and society to develop a sense of responsi­
bility in growing children. Erikson, a neo-Freudian, explained 
the development of guilt as a failure to resolve the conflict 
of the Oedipal crisis. 
In the phallic period the resolution of the Oedipal 
crisis leads to a heightening of conscience, and it 
is the time when the child needs to develop the pre­
requisites for masculine or feminine initiative or 
become prey to a deep and lasting sense of guilt. 
(Lidz, 1968, p. 81) 
In Mowrer's (1961) view guilt developed essentially as 
a function of the learning process. Children, rewarded for 
doing "good" things and punished for doing "bad" things, 
developed their own sense of proper and improper behavior 
through the mechanisms of identification aid imitation. Mow-
rer felt that a strict behavioristic analysis of guilt was 
inadequate to deal with the verbally abstract aspects of the 
phenomenon of guilt. He suggested that the development of 
guilt was facilitated when the learner was dependent upon 
another person who was the source of punishment or discip­
line. The necessity for punishment in the development of a 
sense of guilt was also suggested by Fraiberg (1959) and 
Anna Freud (1968). Both felt that parents should not 
ignore immoral behavior in their children, as the child 
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would not develop a sense of guilt and develop a conscience 
unless his misbehavior were punished. The punishment caused 
the child to incorporate the parents' values as part of his 
superego. 
Several writers have drawn a close relationship between 
guilt and fear (Cheyne & Walter, 1970; Sarason, 1966; Swit-
zer, 1968; Unger, 1962). Unger (1962) defined the affective 
component of guilt as a type of fear. 
Unger made some cogent arguments for the proposition 
that psychological (love-oriented) disciplinary tech­
niques are more potent in guilt training than physical 
or "materialistic" techniques. ... He emphasized that 
psychological techniques of guilt training would work 
only if there was a background of parental nurturance 
and a continuing affectionate relationship between 
parent and child. Love cannot be withdrawn where none 
exists. (Izard, 1977, p. 43) 
The use of punishment to produce guilt in the child is not 
without hazards. MacKinnon (1938) reported that college 
students who cheat on tests have been most often physically 
punished as children. In a study of child-rearing attitudes 
of subjects who varied in guilt, Schill, Evans, and McGovern 
(1976) found that high-guilt subjects had incorporated very 
high standards of proper behavior but were prone to prefer 
child-rearing practices that emphasized strictness, harsh 
discipline and rigid adherence to rules. Glueck and Glueck 
(1950) showed that physical punishment was used more fre­
quently. From their research, Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1963) 
concluded that children who experienced power assertion 
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techniques were dependent upon external sanction and fear 
of punishment in the situation to control their behavior 
and tend to be more aggressive, generally because of the par­
ents' modeling and reinforcement of such behavior. 
Some nonhuman research has been conducted on the phenom­
enon of guilt. Solomon, Turner, and Lessac (1968) conducted 
a study with dogs, teaching them to resist the temptation of 
eating a desirable canned dog food and to eat instead a less 
desirable dry food. The length of delay between the dogs' 
yielding and time of punishment was varied. Generalizations 
from conditioning in dogs to socialization of children should 
be weighed carefully, but the implication from this study was 
that if a child has to wait a long time to get the expected 
punishment, he will have a longer time to experience guilt. 
Thus guilt would be increased by delay of punishment (Izard, 
1977). 
The degree of guilt as a function of the sex of the 
individual has only recently begun to be examined experimen­
tally. Maccoby and Jacklin's (1975) Psychology of Sex Dif­
ferences has become the major authority for assessing sex 
differences in behavior. It was found that the sexes did 
not differ in most aspects of behavior. Hoffman (1977), how­
ever, questioned the correctness of their conclusion that 
females were not more empathetic than males. In sixteen 
studies of this variable, few differences were significant, 
but since all differed in the same direction, Hoffman doubted 
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that the differences could have occurred by chance. Hoff­
man's (1977) findings contradicted Freud's theory that girls, 
not compelled to resolve the Oedipus complex quickly, have 
less internalized moral structures. In Hoffman's projection 
story-completion test, coded for guilt feelings and fear of 
punishment, it was found that in all of the child and adult 
samples, moral transgressions were more likely to be asso­
ciated with guilt in females and fear in males. It was 
believed that this difference was due to the use of more 
induction child-rearing practices for girls and power-
assertion practices for boys. This study suggested that 
females would behave more morally than males in the absence 
of external sanctions. Clearly, more research is needed in 
this area. 
In discussing the phenomenology of guilt in this chapter 
the concern has been with moral or ethical guilt, not with 
guilt in the legal sense. Guilt has been considered as the 
emotion most essential to the development of the conscience 
and moral behavior and a necessary concomitant of personal 
and social responsibility. The intent has been to support 
the present researcher's belief that there is a need for more 
study in this area. The literature reviewed revealed a lack 
of theoretical cohesiveness concerning the antecedents of moral 
development, suggesting the need for experimental research. 
Guilt, however, was widely accepted as an index for measur­
ing moral development. The induction method for producing 
guilt, and thus, moral internalization, is in its conceptual 
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infancy. No research was located in which this technique was 
experimentally tested. Correlational research, however, 
strongly suggested that there might be a link between this 
child-rearing method and high moral development as indicated 
by manifest guilt in the child. 
Summary 
A review of the literature pertaining to moral develop­
ment and guilt, the index by which it is frequently measured, 
generated the following general conclusions: 
1. According to psychoanalytic theory, the child's 
moral development is a function of superego strength, the 
aftermath of successful resolution of the Oedipal Complex. 
Superego and ego conflict produce guilt. The parent facili­
tates this process by rewarding the child with love and pun­
ishing him by depriving him of love. The child internalizes 
the parents' standards through identification. 
2. The cognitive-developmental approach to moral devel­
opment assumes that external rules become transformed into 
internal principles as the child's cognitive processes mature 
with age. Peer interaction and child-rearing practices pro­
vide the child with experiences, but his morality depends 
on the specific point of his cognitive development. 
3. Social learning theory emphasizes teaching moral 
behavior through modeling and conditioning. The role of the 
parent in the internalization process is elevated. 
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4. The induction method of child rearing, in which the 
parent points out to the child the painful consequences of 
his act for the parent or for othersf was found to be highly 
correlated with level of moral development in the child. 
5. The effectiveness of the induction method was attrib­
uted to empathy and optimum arousal of the need for love. 
Previous arguments that the young child was not capable of 
empathetic thought have been weakened by recent research. 
6. Capacity for guilt has been widely established as a 
criterion for measuring internalization of moral values. 
7. There is a need for experimental research to test 
the effectiveness of the induction method in fostering moral 
development in the child. 
8. Manifest guilt can be used as an index for measur­
ing level of moral development. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of the present study was two-fold. The 
primary purpose was to determine the effect of morality con­
tent stories on responses to a Guilt Inventory by first-
grade children. Because of the lack of a research instrument 
to measure moral development in first-grade children, such an 
instrument was developed. It was the intent of the researcher 
to use a story completion test adapted from the methods of 
Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967). The methodology is presented 
in the following order: 
1. Development of the Instrument 
Procedures for Development of the Instrument 
Pilot Study Related to the Development of the 
Instrument 
Instrument Procedural Discussion 
Administration of the Instrument 
Scoring of the Guilt Inventory 
Analysis of the Instrument 
2. The Experiment 
Procedure 
Selection of Subjects for the Experiment 
Selection of Stories for the Experiment 
Conducting the Experiment 
Analysis of the Experimental Data 
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Development of the Instrument 
The general guidelines for developing the research 
instrument for measuring moral development in first graders 
were those used by Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) in their 
assessment of moral development in seventh graders. The 
general guidelines were as follows: 
1. Predominantly middle-class boys and girls were used; 
2. Test construction (the instrument) consisted of 
story completion items: 
3. Moral development level was measured by assessment 
of the index guilt. The guilt ratings as adapted from 
Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) are contained in Appendix B. 
Procedures for Development of the Instrument 
A multiple-choice story completion test was developed 
to assess the intensity and/or presence of morality guilt 
in first-grade children. The stories were constructed by 
the researcher in an attempt to adapt Hoffman and Saltzstein's 
(1967) guilt assessment instrument designed for seventh 
graders into an instrument that could be used to assess 
guilt level in first graders. The stories used will here­
after be referred to as the Inventory Stories. The instrument, 
comprised of the Inventory Stories, will hereafter be referred 
to as the Moral Development Inventory or M.D.I. 
The Moral Development Inventory consisted of four Inven~ 
tory Stories, adapted by the researcher from those used by 
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Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967). Each story contained a pro­
tagonist the age of the subject to be tested. Two of the 
stories contained female protagonists and two contained 
male protagonists. Each story met the criterion for guilt; 
that is, the wrong deed would be presented so that no external 
punishment can be involved with the protagonist's action. 
Each Inventory Story was followed by three multiple-choice 
endings which corresponded to high, medium, and low levels 
of guilt as described by Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967). A 
copy of the criteria is located in Appendix B. Each Inven­
tory Story was read by two first-grade teachers, who were 
asked to make suggestions concerning the suitability of vocab­
ulary content and comprehension level for first graders. The 
final draft of the Inventory Stories was the decision of 
the researcher. 
A pilot study was conducted to determine whether the 
multiple choice endings chosen by the researcher were actual 
occurring responses in first-grade students and if guilt, as 
measured by the Moral Development Inventory, appeared in the 
first-graders' responses on the three levels as defined. 
Pilot Study Related to Development 
of the Moral Development Inventory 
Names of first-grade students in Okaloosa and Walton 
counties and parental permission were obtained through the 
efforts of Okaloosa-Walton Junior College students enrolled 
in Child Development or Psychology courses. Okaloosa-Walton 
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Junior College is located in the central population district, 
serving Okaloosa and Walton counties in Florida. The college 
serves a student body of approximately 9,000 students each 
year. Of this number, approximately 200 students enrolled 
in the aforementioned courses were asked to locate, within 
their resident localities, the names and telephone numbers 
of parents who had first-grade children enrolled in Okaloosa 
or Walton county schools and who would be willing to be con­
tacted by the researcher for possible participation in the 
pilot study. 
Three hundred sixteen first-grade students (168 males, 
148 females) were selected for the pilot study. This consti­
tuted approximately a 15% sample of the first-grade students 
enrolled in Okaloosa and Walton counties and included students 
enrolled in 82 different first-grade classes. The male-female 
distribution of the sample was approximately that of the larger 
population. 
All subjects were individually tested by the researcher. 
The four stories comprising the Moral Development Inventory 
(see Appendix C) were read, without the multiple-choice 
endings, to each of the first-grade subjects. Each subject 
was asked to complete the story by including (a) what he 
thought happened next in the story and (b) how he thought 
the protagonist felt about what happened. The interview 
sessions were tape recorded and then transcribed. From the 
subject's responses, the researcher compiled a list of all 
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story endings, eliminating those of obvious duplication and 
those unrelated to the stories. The researcher expected high 
similarities in response, as prior studies had suggested that 
the emotion guilt was not highly differentiated or complex 
in young children (Izard, 1977; Miller & Swanson, 1960). 
The responses for each Inventory Story were then arranged in 
random order. Two professionals in the mental health field 
ranked each response as (1) low, (2) medium, or (3) high 
indication of guilt, applying the criteria for each guilt 
level used by Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) (Appendix B). 
The raters were instructed to adhere closely to the Hoffman 
and Saltzstein (1967) criteria for guilt level ratings. When 
interrater reliability was satisfied, the responses were 
inspected by the researcher to ascertain that all three levels 
of guilt, as defined, were represented and that previously 
structured multiple-choice responses were actual occurring 
responses, in agreement with the ratings. 
After the multiple-choice M.D.I, met the above 
criteria, it was further adapted for first-grade use. The 
Inventory Stories were illustrated in cartoon fashion, with 
each multiple-choice item a separate cartoon block (see 
Appendix C), as using a combination of auditory (reading the 
story to the child) and visual (showing the cartoon sequences) 
stimuli was believed to increase the child's attentiveness 
to the test (Watson & Lindgren, 1973). 
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Instrument Procedural Discussion 
The development of the instrument took into considera­
tion the following factors: 
1. There may be a tendency for an individual to respond 
to a multiple-choice test in a preset way, to distort 
responses in a particular direction more or less regardless 
of the content of the stimulus (Cronbach, 1970). Lanyon and 
Goodstein (1971), however, have suggested that the distort­
ing influence has been overemphasized. To determine whether 
the first-grade child's responses indicated a set-style, the 
response frequency was analyzed by Chi-square. The null 
hypothesis was that the subject's response to the multiple-
choice test would not be related to any set order preference. 
Rejection requirement was the .05 level of significance. 
2. Can guilt be quantified? Several studies have 
quantified guilt (Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967; Miller & Swan-
son, 1960). Mosher (1966) defended the psychometric founda­
tion of measures of guilt as a necessary condition to success 
in establishing validity of the construct guilt in research 
investigations. 
3. What testing limitation might one expect when work­
ing with the first-grade child? Miller and Swanson (1960) 
found that since young children do not realize the signifi­
cance of a testing situation, they do not disguise their 
thoughts as much as adults. This finding suggested that a 
young child's responses to the Moral Development Inventory 
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would probably indicate his true response as opposed to the 
desire to give the response expected of him. Is the first-
grade child cognitively capable of choosing from three 
variables? Bruner (1973) found symbolic representation 
highly developed toward the end of the preschool period. 
The ability of first-grade children to remember three choices 
and make a decision based on memory has been substantiated 
by Weir (1962), Reese (1965)# and Odom (1967). 
Administration of the Instrument 
The Moral Development Inventory was administered indi­
vidually to each subject in four first-grade classes in Walton 
County, Florida, assigned to this researcher by the Project 
Director of the Walton County Schools, Florida. The total 
population included 73 children (33 females, 40 males). The 
age range was 6 years 1 month to 6 years 11 months. The 
average age was 6 years 3 months. The subjects were predom­
inantly white, middle-class. Only six children were from 
minority groups. Students who were repeating the first grade 
were not included in the population. 
To acclimate the subjects to the presence of the 
researcher and thereby reduce the anxiety they might have 
toward a stranger, the researcher visited each classroom on 
two days prior to the administration of the M.D.I., remaining 
one hour each day. The teacher was requested to introduce 
the researcher as a college student who is "going to be with 
us for a few days so that she can learn more about what 
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first graders are studying these days." The researcher also 
ate in the cafeteria with the subjects on those days. 
On the third day, the teacher was requested to say, 
"Ms. , who has been visiting with us, is writing 
some stories for first graders. She would like to talk to 
each one of you individually about these stories. She will 
be in the next room waiting to talk to you. When I call your 
name, I would like for you to go into the next room and talk 
to Ms. . When she has finished talking to you, 
return to this room and another person will be called. When 
you come back to this room, please do not talk to any of 
your friends about the stories until Ms. has had a 
chance to talk to each one of you." The teacher was instruc­
ted to continue with the daily classroom activities, inter­
rupted only briefly to instruct the next child to go into 
the next room. The teacher was advised that no child was to 
be pressured to leave the room if he felt reluctant to do so. 
The Inventory Stories were presented in random order 
each time the M.D.I, was administered. The three multiple-
choice endings were also presented in random order for each 
story. 
The subjects were given the following directions: 
I am going to read you a story that is not complete. 
It needs an ending. Please listen carefully to the 
story so that you can help me choose the best ending 
for the story. 
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The tester simultaneously read the Inventory Story and 
placed each separate segment of the illustrated M.D.I. 
before the subject. Before the three multiple-choice end­
ings were presented the subject was told: 
I am going to tell you three ways that this story 
can end. I want you to pick the ending that you think 
is the best ending for the story. Wait until you have 
heard all three endings before you choose the best 
ending. 
After the subject had indicated his choice, the tester asked 
the subject to explain what that picture told about the story 
to ascertain that the child was aware of the ending he had 
chosen. The entire procedure was repeated if necessary. 
There was no time limit requirement placed on the testing pro­
cedures . 
The tester marked the subject's response on the Scoring 
Sheet for the M.D.I., a copy of which is contained in Appen­
dix D. After the child had indicated his response, the 
tester said: 
That is fine. Thank you. Now let us go to the next 
story. 
When all four Inventory Stories had been administered, the 
tester said to the subject: 
Thank you for helping me decide the best endings for 
the stories. Your choices were very good. You may 
now return to your (classroom, etc.). 
The subject1s responses to each of the Inventory Stories 
were weighted and summed. The summed score will be referred 
to as the M.D.I. Score. The possible numerical range on 
the M.D.I, was 4-12. 
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Scoring of the Guilt Inventory 
A weighted score of 1 for coded low guilt response, 
2 for coded medium guilt response, and 3 for coded high guilt 
response was given for each multiple-choice ending to the 
Inventory Story. The scores for the four Inventory Stories 
were summed. The resulting score was the subject's M.D.I. 
Score. The possible numerical range of scores was 4-12 
inclusive. For labeling and interpretation, the following 
intervals were used: 
a. scores between 4-6 inclusive = low guiltt 
b. scores between 7-9 inclusive = medium guilt; 
c. scores between 10-12 inclusive = high guilt. 
Rating of Students' Overt Reaction to 
Transgression as Perceived by the Teacher 
The teacher was requested to complete a form, a copy 
of which is in Appendix E. This form, a measure of the 
child's overt reaction to transgression as perceived by the 
teacher, was a replication from the Hoffman and Saltzstein 
(1967) study. The answers were indicators of low, medium, and 
high levels of guilt, with the following quantifications: 
low = 1 
medium = 2 
high = 3 
The numerical range possible score for each subject 
on the teacher form was 3-9 inclusive. 
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Analysis of the Instrument. 
In discussing the problems of construct validity, 
Cronbach (1972) suggested using operationally different 
indicators thought to measure the same trait. The validity 
of a construct is increased if such indicators agree. The 
subject's score on the M.D.I, was correlated with the respec­
tive rating of the subject's overt reaction to transgression 
as perceived by the teacher. The Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient analysis was used and the table of 
critical values for this statistic consulted to determine 
whether the relationship was significant at the .05 level. 
A similar procedure was used to analyze the relationship 
between the student's score on the M.D.I, and his language 
score on the Comprehensive Tests of Basic Skills. No signif­
icant relationship between the student's M.D.I, score and 
his language score would strongly suggest that the M.D.I, was 
measuring something other than language skills (Cronbach, 
1970). Hoffman (1975b) noted that guilt level did not appear 
to be related to IQ or language abilities. Miller and Swan-
son (1960) also found language skills unrelated to indices 
of moral development. The null hypothesis was thus assumed: 
there will be no significant relationship between subject's 
score on the Moral Development Inventory and his score on the 
language portion of the Comprehensive Tests of Basic Skills. 
The Comprehensive Tests of Basic Skills tests are given 
to all first-grade students in the Okaloosa-Walton county 
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schools. These scores were obtained from the students1 
cumulative folders. The complete reference for the Compre­
hensive Tests of Basic Skills is contained in the Bibliography. 
The M.D.I, was subjected to two tests of reli­
ability: split-half and test-retest. The Pearson product 
moment correlation coefficient was used for analyzing the 
relationships. The optimum criterion expected was a minimum 
r value of .80. The M.D.I, was additionally analyzed for 
homogeneity of variance by the F test. The null hypothesis 
was that there is no difference between the individual 
stories that comprise the M.D.I. in guilt-level 
score. Rejection requirement was the .05 significance level. 
The results were discussed. 
The Experiment 
Problem: Can level of moral development, as measured by the 
developed Moral Development Inventory, be increased in first 
graders through exposure to morality content stories? 
Pour first-grade classes in Walton County were assigned 
to the researcher by the Project Director of the Walton 
County, Florida, school system. These first-grade classes 
were not the same classes used to analyze the M.D.I. Two of 
the classes were randomly assigned to the experimental con­
ditions and two to the control conditions (Campbell & Stanley, 
1963). The experimental group was read morality content 
stories, one each day for five consecutive days. The control 
group was read five stories without morality content in like 
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mariner. The subjects in the two groups were individually 
administered the Moral Development Inventory on the fifth 
day after the reading of the fifth story. The difference in 
the responses to the Moral Development Inventory between the 
experimental and control groups was analyzed. 
Procedures 
Selection of subjects for the experiment. The subjects 
for the experiment were demographically similar to the sub­
jects the researcher used to validate the instrument. The 
original number of subjects was 82 (43 males, 39 females). 
The number of subjects used ih the final experiment data 
analysis was 54 (25 males, 29 females). The subject elimi­
nation reasons will be discussed. The age range was 6 years 
6 months to 7 years 3 months. The average age was 6 years 
10 months. 
First-grade subjects were used in an attempt to adapt 
for first grade use the Guilt Inventory used by 
Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) with seventh-grade students. 
The intent in the present study was to choose subjects from 
an area similar in socio-economic background to those used 
in the Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) study. The subjects in 
the Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) study were predominantly 
middle-class. The profile of the Walton counties is also 
middle-class as determined by the 1970 census. 
Selection of stories for the experiment. All stories 
used were chosen from the Okaloosa and Walton county school 
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libraries. The researcher chose five stories that illustrated 
the morality induction process as defined by Hoffman and 
Saltzstein (1967) and five stories that were without the 
morality induction process. The ten stories were read by 
two professionals in the mental health field and one librarian 
to determine whether they agreed that this criterion had 
been met. A deliberate attempt was made by the researcher 
to choose stories comparable in length and of general inter­
est. Additionally, two first-grade teachers read the stories 
to determine if they were suitable for use in the first grade. 
A list of the stories used has been placed in Appendix F. 
These stories will be referred to as the Treatment Stories. 
Conducting the Experiment 
The classes that comprised the experimental group were 
read one morality story each day for five consecutive days. 
The classes that comprised the control group were read one 
nonmorality story each day for five consecutive days. The 
order of the stories read each day was random. The following 
standard procedures were followed: 
1. The researcher asked the classroom teacher to intro­
duce her to the students as a college student who wanted to 
receive some practice in reading stories to first-grade stu­
dents . 
2. The teacher was asked to remain in the room while the 
stories were being read. If there had been a discipline 
problem that the researcher believed to be disturbing to the 
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rest of the class, the researcher would have nodded to the 
teacher, who would then quietly remove that student from the 
class. No students were removed for discipline reasons. 
Other discipline problems, not deemed by the researcher to 
be sufficiently disturbing to require removal of the student, 
were ignored. 
3. The researcher gave the following instructions to 
the students: 
I am going to read you a story. I want you to listen 
very carefully, because I am going to ask you some 
,questions about the story when I have finished reading 
it to you. Please do not interrupt or ask any ques­
tions. 
4. The story was then read. 
5. A short true-false test was given to all students 
to determine whether they had been listening. A copy of the 
test for each story and the type of answer sheet used are 
contained in Appendix G. Any student who missed more than 
one question on any one story was eliminated from the popula­
tion to be analyzed. 
6. The teacher was asked to help give out and take up 
the test answer sheets, making sure the students' first names 
were on each sheet. 
7. The teacher was requested not to discuss the stories 
after the researcher left the room and to discourage the 
students from talking about the stories. 
8. After the reading of the first story and the testing 
for listening, the researcher situated herself in a room or 
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hallway near the classroom. The teacher was requested to 
send out, one at a time, approximately one-fourth of the 
students in the class. The order was determined by the 
teacher. By the end of the fourth day, the researcher had 
talked individually to each student in the classroom. 
9. The researcher asked each student three questions: 
a. How long have you lived in this town? 
b. What is your favorite color? 
c. What do you want to do when you grow up? 
The researcher wrote this down, but the information was irrel­
evant to the experiment. The purpose of this procedure was 
to acclimate the student to the researcher in a simulated 
testing situation. 
10. After the reading of the story on the fifth day, 
the researcher administered the Moral Development Inventory 
individually to each student. Both the Inventory Stories 
and the multiple-choice answers were presented in random 
order. Detailed procedures for administering the Moral 
Development Inventory are included in the first part of the 
Methodology chapter. No student was pressured into partici­
pating in the experiment. Students who missed more than one 
answer on the daily tests were not notified of this. All 
students were administered the Moral Development Inventory, 
but only those who met the listening criteria were included 
in the analysis of the data. 
11. Procedures were identical for experimental and 
control group classes. 
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Analysis of the Experimental Data 
To determine whether story treatment (morality content 
stories and nonmorality content stories) had an effect on 
the moral development level of the subject as measured by 
the Moral Development Inventory, a 3-way ANOVA was con­
ducted. The three factors were: 
a. type of story at two levels 
b. sex at two levels 
c. part of the instrument at four levels 
Of interest were main treatment effect and whether the 
effect of the type of treatment story depended upon sex, 
group, or upon the part of the instrument. The .05 level of 
significance was chosen as appropriate for rejection of the 
null hypothesis. Treatment effect and the various interac­
tions were discussed. 
73 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The results from the analyses of data are reported in 
two parts. Part one deals with the development of the 
instrument, the Moral Development Inventory (M.D.I.), which 
was purported to measure level of moral development in first-
grade children. The results of the univariate 3-factor 
analysis of variance, detailing the main effects of the 
experiment and the interactions, are presented in the second 
part. 
The Instrument 
A pictorial multiple-choice story completion test was 
developed to assess the intensity and/or presence of morality 
guilt in first-grade children. This instrument, hereafter 
referred to as the Moral Development Inventory (or M.D.I.), 
contained four Inventory Stories. Following each Inventory 
Story three multiple-choice endings were given. These end­
ings corresponded to high, medium, and low levels of guilt 
as described by Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967). The M.D.I, 
was read independently by two first-grade teachers in Walton 
County, Florida. Both teachers rated the stories suitable 
in comprehension level and vocabulary for use with first-grade 
children. To confirm that the multiple-choice endings chosen 
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by the researcher were actual occurring responses in first-
grade children, a pilot study was run. 
Pilot Study 
Three hundred sixteen first-grade students (168 males, 
148 females) responded to the four Inventory Stories. The 
stories were presented without the multiple-choice endings so 
that the subjects could complete the stories with open endings. 
Of the 168 males and 148 females who were administered the 
M.D.I., the responses of 92 males and 78 females were elim­
inated by the researcher because they did not relate to the 
stories. The responses from the remaining 76 males and 70 
females were compiled, eliminating duplications, and arranged 
in random order for each of the four Inventory Stories. 
The compilations and eliminations of responses resulted 
in 7 possible responses for Story 1, 5 for Story 2, 5 for 
Story 3, and 6 for Story 4. The children's responses 
were inspected by the researcher and it was noted that all 
three levels of guilt, as defined, were represented and that 
the previously structured multiple-choice responses were 
actual occurring responses. 
A psychiatric social worker and a clinical psychologist 
independently rated the responses to each Inventory Story 
as low (1), medium (2), or high (3) indication of guilt, 
using the criteria for guilt level suggested by Hoffman and 
Saltzstein (1967) (see Appendix B). The response distri­
bution by level of guilt was as follows: 22% high, 52% medium, 
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and 26% low. An interrater reliability of r = .85 was 
obtained, using the Pearson product-moment correlation 
method. The criterion previously selected for interrater 
reliability was thus satisfied. 
The pilot study confirmed that the multiple-choice 
endings to the Inventory Stories were actual occurring 
responses among first graders and that the level of guilt 
the researcher assigned each response correlated highly with 
that of the two raters. The two raters disagreed on only 
two of the multiple-choice guilt ratings previously chosen 
by the researcher. On Inventory Story 3/ rater I marked 
choice B as medium and choice C as high. Rater II marked B 
as high and C as medium. The disagreement was later resolved 
by the two raters consulting Hoffman and Saltzstein's (1967) 
criteria for guilt level and they agreed that B was medium 
and C was considered high level of guilt. The pilot study 
offered no justification for changes in the instrument. 
Analysis of the Instrument 
The M.D.I, was administered to 73 first graders (33 
females and 40 males) in the Walton County, Florida, schools. 
None of these subjects had been in the Pilot Study. A score 
for each subject was obtained. The possible numerical range 
in score was 4 (low) = 12 (high) inclusive. The actual 
occurring range was 4 = 11. For a summary of the responses 
to the M.D.I, see Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Summary Table of the Ss Total Scores 
on the M.D.I. 
Total Ss Male Ss Female Ss 
Number 73 
Range 4 - 11 
Mean 7.75 
40 33 
5 - 1 1  4 - 1 1  
7.78 7.63 
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Validity 
If a subject's responses to a test were a function of 
testing set, validity of the test score was adversely affec­
ted. To determine whether there was a tendency for the first 
graders to respond to a multiple-choice test in a preset 
way, the response order frequency was analyzed by Chi-square. 
The Chi-square data are presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
The null hypothesis was accepted. There was no signif­
icant relationship between subject choice and order of 
presentation of three choices. The subjects demonstrated 
no preference for first-, second-, or third-choice endings 
presented. 
The M.D.I, proposes to measure level of guilt in first-
grade children as an indicator of their level of moral devel­
opment. In order to increase validity of this measurement of 
moral development, the subjects' scores on the M.D.I, were 
correlated with a respective rating of the same subjects' 
overt reaction to transgression as perceived by the teacher. 
A copy of the Teacher Rating Form (adapted from Hoffman & 
Saltzstein, 1967) is shown in Appendix E. The possible score 
range on the Teacher Rating Form (T.R.F.) was 3 (low) = 9 
(high) inclusive. The actual occurring score range was 3-9. 
The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient yielded 
an r value of .37, jo <^.001. The null hypothesis of no rela­
tionship between teacher rating of subjects * moral develop­
ment and subjects' M.D.I, score was rejected. 
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Table 2 
Number of Subjects Who Responded to First, Second, 
or Third Choice Order on Each of the 
Four Inventory Stories 
Inventory 
Stories 
Total Ss Who 
Responded to 
First Choice 
Total Ss Who 
Responded to 
Second Choice 
Total Ss Who 
Responded to 
Third Choice 
1 28 28 17 
2 31 22 20 
3 18 32 23 
4 22 29 22 
N = 73 
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Table 3 
Chi-square Values for Order of Subjects' Responses 
to First, Second, and Third Choices on Each 
of Four Inventory Stories 
Inventory 
Stories 
2 x Values for 
Ss Responding 
to First Choice 
2 2 x Values for x 
Ss Responding Ss 
to Second Choice to 
Values for 
Responding 
Third Choice 
1 .42 .002 .59 
2 1.57 1.19 .01 
3 1.84 .65 .30 
4 .30 .06 .11 
x2 (2, 3) = 7.04 
not significant 
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The subjects' scores on the M.D.I, were correlated with 
the subjects1 scores on the language portion of the Compre­
hensive Tests of Basic Skills to determine whether the M.D.I, 
measured something other than language skills. The Pearson 
product-moment correlation yielded an r value of .32, p <.01. 
The null hypothesis that there would be no significant rela­
tionship between the subjects' scores on the M.D.I, and the 
language portion of the Comprehensive Tests of Basic Skills 
was rejected. The implications of this significant relation­
ship are discussed in the next chapter. 
Reliability 
The usefulness of any test is directly proportional to 
its ability to measure a stated variable or variables with 
consistency. The correlation between scores on the odd and 
even sets is a split-half correlation, from which a reliabil­
ity coefficient for the entire test may be estimated. The 
Pearson product-moment correlation yielded a coefficient 
of r = .46, p <.001. In order to compute the correlation, 
the test was divided in half. A correction value for the 
whole test was computed, yielding r = .63. This correla­
tion was below the desired criterion value of r = .80. 
The F max test for homogeneity of variances indicated that 
there was no significant difference between the Inventory 
Story with the largest variance and the Inventory Story with 
the smallest variance (F max = 1.36, df = 73, k = 4, p>.05). 
After considering the brevity factor of the test (only four 
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Inventory Stories) and the nonsignificant F max Statistic, 
the researcher decided to accept the split-half correlation 
coefficient value of r = .63 as reasonable and no changes 
were made in the instrument. 
To determine whether the M.D.I, yielded the same or 
similar results if administered again, the test was read-
ministered to 20 of the subjects one week after the first 
administration. The Pearson product-moment correlation 
yielded a value of r = .82 in this test re-test evaluation 
of reliability. This correlation was a strong indication of 
test stability. 
Experiment 
Eighty-two first-grade students, enrolled in four dif­
ferent classrooms, were the subjects in this experiment. 
Methodological controls resulted in the loss of 28 subjects. 
The subjects used in the experimental analysis totaled 54. 
Of these, 27 (12 males, 15 females) were in the experimental 
treatment group and 27 (13 males, 14 females) were in the 
control treatment group. For a summary of subject informa­
tion, see Table 4. 
To determine the effect of sex, group assignment, and 
each Inventory Story on the children's M.D.I, scores, a 
three-way (2 sex x 2 group x 4 stories) univariate analysis 
of variance was performed on the subjects' scores on each 
Inventory Story (range = 1-3) (Table 5). This analysis 
indicated that there was a significant effect for sex 
Table 4 
Number of Subjects by Classroom, Treatment Condition, 
Sex, and Removal Method 
Classroom 
I 
Classroom 
II 
Classroom 
III 
Classroom 
IV 
Totals 
Experimental 
Group 
Experimental 
Group 
Control 
Group 
Control 
Group 
Male Ss 11 13 9 11 44 
Female Ss 9 10 9 10 38 
Male: Absentee 
Ss Removed 3 2 2 2 9 
Female: Absentee 
Ss Removed 2 1 2 2 7 
Male: Listening 
Criteria, Ss Removed 2 5 1 2 10 
Female: Listening 
Criteria, Ss Removed 0 1 1 0 2 
Total Male: 
Ss Remaining 6 6 6 7 25 
Total Female: 
Ss Remaining 7 8 6 8 29 
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(a between-subjects factor), F (1, 50) = 4.59, £ <.04; group 
(a between-subjects factor), F (1, 50) = 17.28, p <.0001; 
and the sex by group interaction, F (1, 50) =8.17, £ <.006 
(see Table 5). 
This analysis also indicated no significant difference 
for the presentation of stories (a within-subjects factor), 
F (3, 150) = 2.30, ̂  <.08. There was also no significant 
story by sex interaction, F (3, 150) = .54, £ <.66; nor was 
there a significant story by group interaction, F (3, 150) = 
1.64, £ <.18. There was a significant three-way' (sex x 
troup x story) interaction, F (3, 150) ±= 2.73, £<.05. 
The experimental subjects' total M.D.I, mean scores 
(M = 8.91) were significantly higher than the total M.D.I, 
scores of the control subjects (M = 7.29), indicating a strong 
treatment effect. Further analysis of the data by summing 
the total M.D.I, scores by sex across both the experimental 
and control groups indicated that females (M = 8.55) had 
significantly higher morality, scores than males (M = 7.64). 
The possible total score range on the M.D.I, was 4-12. 
The average morality scores on each separate Inventory 
Story within the M.D.I, (score range = 1-3) were: first 
story (M = 2.03); second story (M = 2.02); third story 
(M = 1.87); and fourth story (M = 2.20). There was no sig­
nificant difference in the four Inventory Story means 
(Table 5). For a summary of the total M.D.I, mean scores 
and Inventory Story mean scores, see Table 6. 
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Table 5 
Univariate Analysis of Variance on the Effects 
of Sex, Group Assignment, and Stories 
on Average Morality Score 
Source df MS F 
Sex 1 2.4 4.59* 
Group 1 9.06 17.28* 
Sex x Group 1 4.28 8.17* 
S (Group x Sex) 50 o 52 
Story 3 1.00 2.30 
Story x Sex 3 .24 .54 
Story x Group 3 .72 1.64 
Story x Group x Sex 3 1.19 2.73* 
Story x S (Group x Sex) 150 .44 
* J? <-05 
Table 6 
Summary Table of Total M.D.I. Means (R = 4-12) 
and Inventory Story Means (R = 1-3) 
Total Ss 
Experimental 
Male Ss 
Control Experimental Control 
Male Ss Female Ss Female Ss 
Number 
M.D.I. 
Means 
54 
8.11 
12 
9.08 
13 
6.31 
15 
8.80 
14 
8 .28  
Inventory 
Story 1 
Means 2.03 2.00 1.77 2.13 2.21 
Inventory 
Story 2 
Means 2.01 2.25 1.77 2.33 1.71 
Inventory 
Story 3 
Means 1.87 2.25 1.23 2.07 1.93 
Inventory 
Story 4 
Means 2.20  2.58 1.54 2.27 2.43 
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Presented in Table 7 are the results of Newman-Keuls 
post hoc comparisons on the triple interaction which indicated 
that Experimental Males had significantly higher morality 
scores on Story 4 than on Story 1, Story 2, or Story 3. 
There was no difference among the Experimental Males1 scores 
on Story 1, Story 2, or Story 3. 
Results of Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons on the 
triple interaction indicated that Control Males had signif­
icantly lower morality scores on Story 3 than on any of the 
other stories. There were no differences among the Control 
Males' morality scores on Story 1, Story 2, or Story 4. 
These results are presented in Table 8. 
Results of Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons on the 
triple interaction indicated that there were no significant 
differences among the experimental female subjects1 moral­
ity scores on any of the four stories (Table 9). 
Results of Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons on the 
triple interaction indicated that Control Females had sig­
nificantly lower morality scores on Story 2 and Story 3 than 
they did on Story 4. They also had significantly lower 
morality scores on Story 2 than on Story 1. There were no 
differences between their scores on Story 2 and Story 3, 
Story 1 and Story 3 or Story 1 and Story 4 (Table 10). 
Results of Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons on the 
triple interaction indicated that on Story 1, males assigned 
to the control group had significantly lower morality scores 
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Table 7 
Suiranary Table for Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Comparisons on 
Average Morality Score for Experimental Male Subjects 
for the Group x Sex x Story Interaction 
Average Morality Score 
Story 4 Story 3 Story 2 Story 1 r C.V. at 
2.58 2.25 2.25 2.0 .05 
2.58 .33* , .33* .58* 4 .32 
2.25 - .25 3 .29 
2.25 .25 2 .26 
2 . 0  
* E <-05 
Table 8 
Summary Table for Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Comparisons on 
Average Morality Score for Control Male Subjects 
for the Group x Sex x Story Interaction 
Average Morality Score 
Story 1 Story 2 Story 4 Story 3 r C.V. at 
1.77 1.77 1.54 1.23 .05 
1.77 - - .23 .54* 4 .32 
1.77 - .23 .54* 3 .29 
1.54 .31* 2 .26 
1.23 
*  £  < - 0 5  
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Table 9 
Summary Table for Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Comparisons on 
Average Morality Score for Experimental Female Subjects 
for the Group x Sex x Story Interaction 
Average Morality Score 
Story 2 Story 4 Story 1 Story 3 r C.V. at 
2.33 2.27 2.13 2.07 .05 
2.33 - .06 .20 .26 4 .32 
2.27 - .14 .20 3 .29 
2.13 .06 2 .26 
2.07 
Table 10 
Summary Table for Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Comparisons on 
Average Morality Score for Control Female Subjects 
for the Group x Sex x Story Interaction 
Average Morality Score 
Story 4 Story 1 Story 3 Story 2 r C.V. at 
2.43 2.21 1.93 1.71 .05 
2.43 - .22 .50* .72* 4 .32 
2.21 - .28 .50* 3 .29 
1.93 .22 2 .26 
1.71 
* £ <.05 
than female subjects assigned to either the control or 
experimental group. Otherwise there were no significant 
differences between average morality scores on Story 1 
(Table 11). 
Results of Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons on the 
triple interaction indicated that on Story 2, Control Males 
and Control Females had significantly lower morality scores 
than Experimental Males or Experimental Females. There was 
no significant difference between the Control Males and 
Control Females or between the Experimental Males and Exper­
imental Females in terms of morality scores on Story 2 
(Table 12). 
Results of Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons on the 
triple interaction indicated that on Story 3, males assigned 
to the control group had significantly lower morality scores 
than all other subjects. In addition, females assigned to 
the control group had significantly lower scores on Story 3 
than males assigned to the experimental group. There was no 
difference between morality scores of Experimental Males and 
Experimental Females or between Experimental Females and 
Control Females on Story 3 (Table 13). 
Results of Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons on the 
triple interaction indicated that on Story 4, Control Males 
had lower average morality scores than Control Females, 
Experimental Females, and Experimental Males. Experimental 
Females had lower morality scores on Story 4 than Experi­
mental Males. There was no difference between the scores 
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Table 11 
Summary Table for Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Comparisons 
on Average Morality Score on Story 1 for 
the Group x Sex x Story Interaction 
Average Morality Score 
Control 
Females 
Exper ime n t a1 
Females 
Experimental 
Males 
Control 
Males r C.V. i 
2.21 2.13 2.00 1.77 .05 
2.21 - .08 .21 .44* 2 .26 
2.13 - .13 .46* 2 .26 
2.00 .23 2 .26 
1.77 
* £ <.05 
Table 12 
Summary Table for Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Comparisons 
on Average Morality Score on Story 2 for 
the Group x Sex x Story Interaction 
Average Morality Score 
Experimental 
Females 
Experimental 
Males 
Control 
Males 
Control 
Females r C.V. 
2.33 2.25 1.77 1.71 .05 
2.33 - .08 .56* .62* 2 .26 
2.25 - .48* .54* 2 .26 
1.77 — .06 2 .26 
1.71 
*£ <.05 
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Table 13 
Summary Table for Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Comparisons 
on Average Morality Score on Story 3 for 
the Group x Sex x Story Interaction 
Average Morality Score 
Experimental 
Males 
Experimental 
Females 
Control 
Females 
Control 
Males r C.V. 
2.25 2.06 1.93 1.23 .05 
2.25 - .19 .32* 1.02* 2 .26 
2.06 - .13 .83* 2 .26 
1.93 .70* 2 .26 
1.23 
* £ <.05 
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of the Experimental and Control Females or between the 
Experimental Males and Control Females on Story 4 (Table 14). 
Results of Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons on the 
double interaction (sex x group ) (Table 15) indicated that 
across all four stories, Control Male Subjects had lower 
morality scores than all other subjects. There were no dif­
ferences in morality scores among the Experimental Females, 
Experimental Males, and Control Female subjects. The average 
morality score for Control Males was 1.58; for Experimental 
Males, 2.27; Control Females, 2.07: and Experimental Females, 
2.20. 
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Table 14 
Summary Table for Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Comparisons 
on Average Morality Score on Story 4 for 
the Group x Sex x Story Interaction 
Average Morality Score 
Experimental Control Experimental Control 
Males Females Females Males r C.V. at 
2.58 2.43 2.26 1.54 .05 
2.58v .15 .32* 1.04* 2 .26 
2.43 - .17 .89* 2 .26 
2.26 - .72* 2 .26 
1.54 -
* £<.05 
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Table 15 
Summary Table for Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Comparisons 
on Average Morality Score for the 
Group x Sex Interaction 
Average Morality Score 
Experimental Experimental Control Control 
Males Females Females Males r C.V. at 
2.27 2.20 2.07 1.58 .05 
2.27 - .07 .20 .69* 4 .34 
2.20 - .13 .62* 3 .31 
2.07 .49* 2 .26 
1.58 
* p <.05 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The Moral Development Inventory (M.D.I.) was developed 
by the researcher in an attempt to adapt Hoffman and Saltz-
stein's (1967) Guilt Inventory (suitable for seventh graders) 
into an instrument that would measure level of moral devel­
opment in first graders. The format of the resultant M.D.I, 
differed considerably from the Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) 
instrument, which consisted of an open-ended story comple­
tion test scored by only Drs. Hoffman and Saltzstein. 
Their scoring process was contaminated by examiner bias, 
as not only were item statements scored, but also "tone" 
of the subject's story. Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) 
achieved high interrater reliability only through repeated 
conferences. The intent of those researchers, however, 
was not to develop an instrument that would be used rou­
tinely to measure guilt, but rather to determine, through 
their close and dedicated work, whether students who were 
judged high in moral development (high guilt score) were the 
products of a particular child-rearing technique. Their 
research confirmed that there was a positive correlation 
between high guilt score and the induction method of child 
discipline. 
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The present experimenter accepted certain basic assump­
tions from the Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) research: 
1. The levels of guilt as defined by Hoffman and Saltz­
stein (1967) were reasonable descriptions of low, 
medium, and high levels of guilt. 
2. Their methods of assigning child-rearing technique 
labels to parents were reliable and valid. 
Therefore, in the development of the M.D.I., there was 
a deliberate attempt to reconcile story-completion multiple-
choice answers with the three levels of guilt defined by 
Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) and to score expressions of 
guilt in a manner similar to theirs. A deliberate attempt 
was made to model the M.D.I, stories after those used by 
Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967), i.e., stories concerned with 
situations of conscience-guilt# stories in which the protag­
onist was the age of the subject, and story situations that 
could definitely occur in the life experiences of the subjects 
being tested. The Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) instrument 
allowed for open-ended story completion, whereas the M.D.I, 
was structured with three multiple-choice endings. The 
M.D.I, was further adapted for use with first graders by 
simplifying the vocabulary and illustrating the stories in 
cartoon fashion. 
The decision to structure the answers into a multiple-
choice test by the present researcher was based on the belief 
that an open-ended test for first graders would yield much 
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useless data, and that reliability in scoring would be 
difficult to achieve. The pilot study more than confirmed 
this. 
Pilot Study 
Of the 168 males and 148 females who were administered 
the M.D.I, with open endings, the responses of 92 males and 
78 females were eliminated by the researcher because they 
did not relate to the stories. Responses that were useless 
for the purpose of this study fell into several categories: 
1. Subjects who would not talk. No pressure was placed 
upon any subject. Such subjects who would not talk were 
thanked for listening and dismissed. There were only five 
such subjects. 
2. Subjects who said "I don't know." It was the research­
er's belief that most of these subjects, given no guidelines 
for story endings, were reluctant to venture an ending that 
might be wrong. 
3. Subjects who were eager to talk—about everything 
except the story endings. 
4. Subjects who centered on some action or event in the 
story other than the completion of the story. Two examples 
of such responses were: 
a. to Story 2—"You should always buy Coca-Cola in 
the cans." 
b. to Story 4—"If you eat too many potatoes you'll 
throw up." 
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5. Subjects whose responses indicated that "your sins 
will find you out." Although each story was structured so 
that no external punishment could be involved with the 
protagonist1s actions—he could always escape detection— 
many subjects ignored this entirely and recommended immediate 
punishment. One male subject was particularly vehement 
about Story 3: "That's cheating! His mother should beat 
the hell out of him!" 
The open-ended responses which could be coded into levels 
of guilt were highly similar, yielding a total of 16 different 
story endings: 7 possible responses for Story 1, 5 for 
Story 2, 5 for Story 3, and 6 for Story 4. This suggested 
that guilt may not be a highly differentiated emotion in 
first-grade children, but since all three levels of guilt, 
as defined by Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) were represented 
in the responses, the Pilot Study served its purpose. The 
interrater reliability (r = .85) between the two mental 
health professionals who rated all the responses into high, 
medium, or low levels of guilt suggested that the guilt levels 
descriptions (Appendix B) allowed discrete guilt level deci­
sions to be made with considerable agreement. This finding 
added strength to the researcher's decision that those levels 
of guilt were reasonable descriptions of high, medium, and low 
levels of guilt. Because the results from the pilot study 
did not warrant any changes in the M.D.I, it was considered 
ready to use. 
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Validity of the Instrument 
Test technology is seldom refined enough to meet all 
demands. One of the demands is for assessment of performance. 
In a multiple-choice test, such as the M.D.I., it was nec­
essary to determine whether the choice was a function of 
decision or set. "Response sets dilute a test with factors 
not intended to form part of the test content, and to reduce 
its logical validity" (Cronbach, 1950, p. 145). Three types 
of response set were considered. The response set, to work 
for speed rather than accuracy, was controlled by the test­
ing procedure. No time limit was stipulated and the subject 
was allowed to "ponder" at leisure. The subject was not 
promised any reward for finishing the test; therefore, he 
did not rush toward finishing in order to receive certain 
benefits. The response set of responding just to respond 
was controlled by the experimenter's asking each subject to 
tell her what the story ending was after the subject pointed 
toward one of the three pictorial choices. If the subject 
could not tell the experimenter the content of the pictorial 
choice, the entire test item was repeated. No subject needed 
the story repeated more than once. The Chi-square value for 
order of subject's responses to first, second, and third 
2 choice, x (2, 3) = 7.04, jd^.05, indicated that there was 
no significant relationship between subject's choice and 
order of presentation of three choices. According to Cron-
bach (1950) the only major form of fixed alternative test 
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which has been found relatively free from response sets is 
the multiple-choice item. The present study also confirmed 
this. The experimenter was satisfied that response set did 
not act as a significant source of error in measurement on 
the M.D.I. 
To establish construct validity, the subjects' scores 
on the M.D.I, were correlated with respective ratings of the 
same subjects1 overt reaction to transgression as perceived 
by the teacher. The Pearson product-moment correlation 
yielded an r value of .37, jd <.001. Although this relation­
ship was highly significant, it was not a strong relationship 
for predictive purposes. Low correlations between different 
measures of a construct are the rule rather than the excep­
tion (Mischel, 1968). Further measures of the construct 
moral development would be advisable. Suggestions include 
parent ratings, peer ratings, and direct behavioral assess­
ment of the subject in a moral-dilemma situation. Tests of 
natural observations often yield additional data; however, more 
than any other procedure, they represent a direct assessment 
of criterion behavior. In the final analysis, what a person 
does is more important than what he says he will do. The 
value of a paper and pen test is its economical time utility. 
If such a test can closely approximate the actual behavior, 
it serves the utility purpose. Assuming the subjects being 
tested identified with the protagonist, this test is similar 
to a check-list which contains both behaviors and feelings. 
101 
The present level of validity suggested that while the M.D.I, 
may not be sufficiently sensitive to use for individual diag­
nosis , it may be considered useful for assessing group 
directional change. This will be discussed further in rela­
tion to the experiment. 
The positive significant correlation between the M.D.I, 
scores and the subjects1 language grade level scores from the 
Comprehensive Tests of Basic Skills suggested that the test 
had a language component. The test is a verbal instrument, 
requiring language comprehension. Although the children's 
responses required only that they point to item A, B, or C 
of the pictorial M.D.I., they had to understand the verbal 
directions and the story theme. Modest correlations with 
ability to communicate (.24-.40) are to be expected with 
tests that require social insight (Lanyon & Goodstein, 1971). 
Nevertheless, the data considered in total suggested that 
something was being measured other than just language compre­
hension. Several subjects who scored high on the M.D.I, had 
very low language grade-level scores. The highly significant 
difference in scores on the M.D.I, which resulted from a 
one-week treatment effect was unlikely to be related to a 
sudden increase in language grade level score or language 
comprehension improvement, as the control subjects were 
exposed to an equal language treatment. 
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Reliability of the Instrument 
The test-retest reliability coefficient, r = .82, was a 
strong indication of the M.DoI.'s stability. The time 
interval was one week. There is a possibility that memory 
of the individual Inventory Stories was a factor in the high 
test-retest score. Turiel (1966) discussed the testing prob­
lems of using story situations and suggested that the subjects 
might be responding to the memory of their prior responses. 
The test-retest coefficient, however, was higher than the 
majority of reported similar test-retest coefficients in the 
more than 300 measures of child behavior and development 
reported in Tests and Measurement in Child Development: A 
Handbook (Johnson & Bommarito, 1971). Further information 
could have been provided by retesting another sample of the 
original 73 subjects after two weeks. This was not possible, 
because of the end of the school term. 
A Pearson product-moment correlation of r = .63 on a 
split-half reliability test is quite high considering that 
there were only 4 items on the M.D.I. Reliability increases 
with the length of a test, and a reliability coefficient of 
r = .70 is considered a good indication of reliability (Cron-
bach, 1972). The most obvious solution to increase the reli­
ability of the M.D.I, would be to add more items. The 
attention span of the first grader, however, is a definite 
factor to consider. The experimenter felt that the average 
time of 20 minutes to administer the M.D.I, individually was 
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already straining the limits of the first grader's attention 
span. Dividing the testing session into two or more testing 
periods would reduce internal validity as the researcher 
would have little or no control over such variables as his­
torical events or maturation between testing sessions. 
Strength was added to the split-half reliability measure­
ment by considering it in conjunction with the nonsignificant 
P max test for homogeneity of variances; however, whatever 
aspect of personality functioning one is measuring, it is 
important to include an adequate sample of relevant situa­
tions (Goldfried & Sprafkin, 1974). It is questionable 
whether four item-situations were an adequate sample. This 
matter will be discussed more fully under Experiment. 
The following conclusions were drawn from the data on 
the development of the M.D.I.: 
1. The null hypothesis that the subject's response to 
the multiple-choice test would not be related to any set 
order preference was accepted. 
2. The subject's M.D.I, score was significantly related 
to the respective rating of the subject's overt reaction to 
transgression as perceived by the teacher. 
3. The subject's M.D.I, score was also positively 
related to his grade-level score on the language portion of 
the Comprehensive Tests of Basic Skills. 
4. The test-retest reliability measure surpassed the 
previously stated criterion for acceptance (r = .82). 
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5. The split-half reliability measure, r = .63, was 
lower than preferred, but was accepted as reasonable con­
sidering that the test only had 4 items and that the F max 
test for homogeneity of variance was nonsignificant. 
Experiment 
The present study looked at issues related to moral 
development and attempted to determine whether level of 
moral development, as measured by the M.D.I., could be 
increased in first-grade subjects through exposure to moral­
ity content stories. A three-way univariate analysis of 
variance was used to analyze the data. The factorial design 
allowed for studying of the effects on the dependent variable 
(the M.D.I, score) of three independent variables (sex, group, 
and story). The design also made it possible to determine 
whether the three independent variables had an interaction 
effect on the children's responses to the stories. Addi­
tionally, the design permitted the researcher further anal­
ysis of the M.D.I, by determining whether there was a dif­
ferential treatment effect on each of the four Inventory 
Stories that comprised the M.D.I. 
Although the original number of subjects in the experi­
ment was 82, various controls to strengthen the effects of 
the independent variable (type of treatment) on the dependent 
variable (M.D.I, score) resulted in 27 subjects (13 males, 
14 females) in the experimental treatment group and 27 subjects 
(12 males, 15 females) in the control treatment group. 
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The null hypothesis, that there would be no difference 
in level of moral development as measured by the M.D.I, in 
the experimental group of first graders read morality content 
stories and the control group read stories without morality 
content, was rejected# F (1, 50) = 17.28, £ -<.0001. This 
indicated a very large between-subjects treatment effect, 
which was somewhat surprising. The immediacy effect may not 
have remained stable, and further research is necessary to 
determine whether the treatment effect was stable over time, 
but the implications are promising. Hoffman and Saltzstein's 
(1967) position that the induction method of child-rearing 
was positively related to moral development in the child would 
appear strengthened. 
The strong significant treatment effect may have been 
related to lack of complete randomness in the design. The 
research took place in a classroom situation in which the 
independent variable was manipulated under as carefully con­
trolled conditions as the situation would permit. However, 
the individual classes were randomly assigned to experimental 
and control conditions, but the individual subjects were not. 
Additionally, there was no pre-test to determine whether the 
subjects differed in level of moral development before the 
treatment. This weakness in design, however, was counter­
balanced by the magnitude of the treatment effect. 
The ANOVA also indicated no significant difference for 
the presentation of stories, F (3, 150) = 2.30, £ <".08. 
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There was no differential treatment effect among the four 
Inventory Stories, which meant that each story was equally 
effective in measuring the treatment effect. This was in 
agreement with the reliability data from the development of 
the M.D.I., i.e., high split-half reliability (r = .63), 
and homogeneity of variances for the 4 Inventory Stories, 
F max = 1.36 (df = 73, k = 4 )  ,  £^>.05. 
The significant effect for sex resulted in rejection of 
the null hypothesis that there would be no difference in level 
of moral development as a function of sex of subject, 
F (1, 50) = 4.59, p ̂ .04. The sex by group interaction was 
also significant, F (1, 50) = 8.17, _p <.006. The difference 
in the M.D.I, mean scores of the control males (M = 6.3) and 
the control females (M = 8.3) is in agreement with Hoffman's 
(1977) finding that females had more highly internalized 
moral structures. Hoffman attributed the difference to the 
use of more induction child-rearing practices for girls and 
power-assertion for boys. If his assumption is correct, it 
may offer an explanation for the tremendous difference in 
scores between the control males as measured by the M.D.I, 
and the experimental males (M = 6.30 - M = 9.08) and the 
lesser difference in scores of control and experimental 
females (M = 8.28 - M = 8.80). It is certainly suggestive 
of differential child-rearing practices for males and females, 
but supportive of the effectiveness of the induction method 
for both. Although the treatment effect was significant 
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for males and not for females, the experimental females' 
mean scores were higher than the control female mean scores. 
While the lower mean scores of the control males was antic­
ipated, the failure to find a significant treatment effect for 
females was puzzling. Either the treatment (five morality-
content stories) did not work for females, or the M.D.I, was 
not sufficiently sensitive to detect differences that the 
treatment caused. It was expected that the story treatment, 
with its strong language component, would be more effective 
with females. Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) noted that although 
females have greater verbal ability than males, these dif­
ferences do not emerge until about age eleven. Perhaps the 
language component would create greater differences in effect 
with older children. It is more probable that the females 
were already acclimated to the induction process (Hoffman, 
1977), thus failing to show a significant change in moral 
development level with a five-day treatment. The initial 
superior effect of the treatment on males may have leveled 
under a longer treatment condition. 
The difference in the male-female scores could also have 
been related to the specific sample used. In the develop­
ment of the M.D.I., 73 subjects (33 females, 40 males) from 
four different classrooms were assessed. The nontreatment 
scores for males and females were very similar (females, 
M = 7.63; males, M = 7.78). In the experiment, using four 
different classrooms, the M.D.I, nontreatment mean score for 
females was M = 8.28 and for males, M = 6.31. 
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In the present study, the significant main effects are 
qualified by a significant three-way interaction. This 
interaction indicated that there were, in fact, no general 
consistencies. The interaction in the ANOVA, using Indepen­
dent Story score as the dependent variable, suggested that 
an accurate picture could only be obtained by considering 
the interaction of sex x group x stories. Newman-Keuls post 
hoc comparisons of means tests scores detected several 
significant differences. 
The Newman-Keuls tests scores were examined for possible 
trends related to the differential treatment effect by sex. 
Experimental males had significantly higher morality scores 
on Story 4 than on Story 1, 2, or 3. There were no signifi­
cant differences among the experimental female subjects' M.D.I, 
scores on any of the four stories. Story 4, then, was more 
sensitive in measuring treatment effect for males, but the 
four stories measured treatment effect equally in females. 
Since two of the Inventory Stories contained male protag­
onists and two contained female protagonists, the data were 
examined to determine whether the subjects scored higher on 
Inventory Stories with like-sex protagonists. Maccoby and 
Jacklin (1974) noted that children choose same-sex models 
and use these models more than opposite-sex models for pat­
terning their own behavior. The present study did not find 
that subjects scored higher on the Inventory Stories with 
same-sex protagonists. There was no significant difference 
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in experimental females scores on Stories 1 and 3 (male pro­
tagonists) and Stories 2 and 4 (female protagonist). The 
experimental males scored highest on Story 4 (female protag­
onist) , with no significant difference in the scores on 
Stories 1 (male), 2 (female), and 3 (male). 
The scores were also examined to identify any trends 
related to story theme. At least a portion of the measuring 
strength of the M.D.I, can be attributed to its item situation 
variability. The Inventory Stories deal with morality in 
four different behavioral situations. Story 1 concerns the 
subject's willingness to allow an animal (a pet) to be pun­
ished instead of himself. Story 2 concerns peer group 
pressure versus self-initiated personal responsibility. 
Story 3 deals with school dishonesty, and Story 4 with 
deceiving a parental figure. The similarity of the experi­
mental female subjects' scores on each test could indicate 
that their experience and training had provided opportunities 
for moral behavior to have generalized to several different 
situations (Endler & Hunt, 1969). The significantly higher 
score on Story 4 for males could indicate cultural condition­
ing. Although the primary morality issue in Story 4 was 
deception, it was the only story that concerned a work task 
and the responsibility of finishing a job. There is some 
evidence that differential parental treatment of the sexes 
affects this variable as early as preschool (Hurlock, 1964). 
110 
Experimenter reliability was not investigated. This 
researcher individually tested each subject and also performed 
the treatment conditions to both the control and experimental 
groups. Whereas the latter condition had built-in control 
(the difference between the two groups was not the result of 
different researcher personality), it is essential to note 
that different scores may have been obtained by different 
testers. The experimenter personal attributes effect has 
been studied by many (Hyman, 1954: Johnson, 1976, Masling, 
1965), indicating that experimenters differing in such char­
acteristics as sex, age, ethnic identity, prestige, anxiety, 
friendliness, dominance, and warmth at times obtained diver­
gent results when testing similar subjects. The scores on 
the M.D.I. in the present study could have been affected by 
the fact that this researcher has had many years' experience 
working with young children, the children (with only 6 excep­
tions) were white, as was the experimenter, the first graders 
all had been receiving instructions from female teachers, 
there were no.disruptive discipline problems, and all chil­
dren readily agreed to being tested. It is suggested that 
further research utilize experimenters of different sexes, 
races, and ages, and experimenters who do not know the 
experimental hypothesis. 
In summary, the analyses of the experimental data pro­
vided the following information: 
1. The treatment effect (reading of morality stories 
for five consecutive days) was highly significant, but only 
Ill 
for the male subjects. The control males had significantly 
lower scores than all other subjects, but the treatment 
effect was successful in bringing those scores up to the 
experimental female scores. 
2. The individual Inventory Stories were equally sen­
sitive in measuring treatment effect for female subjects. 
Story 4 was more effective in measuring treatment effect 
for males. 
3. Subjects did not score significantly higher on 
Inventory Stories with like-sex models. 
Implications of the study and suggestions for further 
research are discussed in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
The purposes of the study were two-fold: (a) to develop 
an instrument for measuring level of moral development in 
first-grade children and (b) to experimentally test the 
hypothesis that moral development could be fostered in first-
grade children by reading them morality stories selected for 
their similarity to the induction child-rearing technique 
described by Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967). The induction 
technique was defined as instructing the child concerning 
the consequences of his wrong deeds on others. Hoffman and 
Saltzstein (1967) found a positive correlation between the 
induction child-rearing technique and high moral development 
in children. A later review of the research on child-rearing 
(Hoffman, 1975a) also supported the generalization that moral 
orientation was associated with the mother's frequent use of 
inductive discipline techniques. 
The study of morality has at various times been a 
central issue in child development (Albert & Kluckhorn, 1959), 
but theory concerning moral development has not been con­
clusive. Psychoanalytic theory, prevalent in the 1950*3, 
stressed the importance of the parent in shaping the moral 
character of the child (Hoffman, 1970). The parent was 
113 
encouraged to punish the child by depriving him of love. To 
avoid losing parental love, the child accepted the parents' 
standards of conduct as his own, thus developing a system 
of internalized control (l2ard, 1977). Later studies (Allin-
smith & Greening, 1955; Hill, 1960; Hoffman & Saltzstein, 
1967) did not find the parental discipline technique of love-
withdrawal related to moral development. 
The cognitive-developmental.theoretical approach to 
moral development assumed that rules became transformed into 
internal principles through cognitive processes which evolved 
in stages (Kohlberg, 1963; Piaget, 1932). Although the 
theory stressed intellectual development over time as the 
major precursor to moral development, peer interaction, 
child-rearing practices, and even direct instruction were 
considered important environment facilitators (Kohlberg, 
1966; Piaget, 1932; Stanton, 1976). The weakness in the 
cognitive development theory centered predominantly on the 
issue that there was not a strong correlation between high 
moral reasoning and moral behavior (Stanton, 1976). The 
theory also indicated that moral development always increased, 
that there was no regression (Kohlberg, 1975). Research 
refuting that position is prevalent (Hsu, 1961; Simpson, 
1974; Witkin, 1974). 
The social learning theory position that reward and 
punishment in the home were major variables in the development 
of morality (Lovell, 1971) led to research which attempted 
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to locate those specific parental practices that correlated 
with morality characteristics in children (Sears, Maccoby, & 
Levin, 1967). Behavior research was interested in the environ­
mental contingencies that altered behavior in the desired way. 
Skinner (1969) explained moral behavior as learned through 
practice and reinforcement. Some of the most profound and 
discriminating teaching of morality probably takes place 
through the study of literature. McClelland (1961) found 
that the materials the school selects for study influence 
the children's values, attitudes, and behavior. The social 
learning theory of moral development was the basis for the 
present experimental study on fostering moral development. 
Although theory on how a person becomes moral was not 
conclusive, there was much agreement among theorists that 
guilt could be used as a measurable index for the presence 
of moral development (Ausubel, 1958; Fenichel, 1955; Freud, 
1964; Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967: Puiynski, 1975; Redl & 
Wineman, 1951). The first purpose of the present study, to 
develop an instrument for measuring level of moral develop­
ment in first-grade children, accepted the assumption that 
guilt was a measurable index of moral development and used 
it to determine level of moral development in first graders. 
A multiple-choice story completion test was developed 
to assess the intensity and/or presence of morality guilt 
in first-grade children. The instrument was modeled after 
the instrument used by Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) to 
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measure guilt level in seventh graders. The instrument, 
hereafter referred to as the Moral Development Inventory, 
or M.D.I., consisted of Pour Inventory Stories. Each story 
contained a protagonist the age of the subject to be tested. 
Each story presented a situation in which the protagonist 
committed a wrong deed. The wrong deed was known only to the 
protagonist and no external punishment was involved. Each 
Inventory Story was followed by three multiple-choice endings, 
constructed by the researcher to correspond to high, medium, 
and low levels of guilt as described by Hoffman and Saltz-
stein (1967). The Moral Development Inventory was subjected 
to a pilot study for verification that the story theme and 
vocabulary were suitable for use with first graders, and that 
the multiple-choice endings were representative of the end­
ings given by first graders. Three hundred first-grade 
students (168 males, 148 females) were administered the 
M.D.I, without the multiple-choice endings so that the sub­
jects could complete the stories with open endings. Analysis of 
the responses from the pilot study offered no justification 
for changing the structure of the Moral Development Inventory. 
The Moral Development Inventory was then administered 
to 73 first graders (33 females, 40 males) in Walton County, 
Florida. A numerical score was obtained for each subject 
(see Appendix D for scoring procedures). Each subject's 
score was correlated with a respective rating from the 
subject's teacher (see Teacher Form in Appendix E). The 
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Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, r = .37, 
£<.001, resulted in the rejection of the null hypothesis 
that there would be no significant relationship between the 
subjects' scores on the M.D.I, and the teacher rating of 
subject's moral development. The correlation between the 
subject's score on the M.D.I, and his score on the language 
portion of the Comprehensive Tests of Basic Skills, r = .32, 
£ <.01, also resulted in the rejection of the null hypothesis 
that there would be no significant relationship between the 
subjects' scores on the M.D.I, and the scores on the language 
portion of the Comprehensive Tests of Basic Skills. The 
possibility that the subjects' response was a function of 
2 response set was ruled out by Chi-square analyses, x (2, 30 = 
7.04, £>^.05. The Moral Development Inventory was analyzed 
for split-half reliability by the Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient, r = .63, p <.001. The Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient was also used to 
determine test-retest reliability, r = .82. The computed 
F max statistic for homogeneity of variances was 1.36, 
df = 73, k = 4, jg ^>..05, indicating internal consistency in 
the four Inventory Stories. The Moral Development Inventory 
was accepted as satisfactory, and was used to assess the 
subjects in the experiment. 
The subjects in the experiment were 27 first graders 
assigned to experimental treatment conditions and 27 first 
graders assigned to control treatment conditions. The 
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experimental subjects ware read one morality story each day 
for five consecutive days. The morality stories were chosen 
to illustrate the induction technique as defined by Hoffman 
and Saltzstein (1967). The control subjects were read one 
nonmorality story each day for five consecutive days. The 
experimental effects were assessed by a three-way ANOVA, 
which determined that there was a significant main effect 
for group, a significant effect for sex, and a significant 
effect for group by sex. The analysis indicated no signifi­
cant differences in treatment effect on the individual 
Inventory Stories, but there was a significant three-way 
(sex x group x story) interaction. Newman-Keuls post hoc 
comparisons on the means scores revealed that the differences 
were primarily related to the very low scores of the control 
males, and the lack of significant treatment effect on the 
females (see Tables 6-14). 
Conclusions 
When analyzing the results of the study the following con 
elusions were drawn. 
1. It was possible to foster moral development in the 
male first-grade children by reading them morality content 
stories chosen to duplicate the inductive method described 
by Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967). The results of the study 
did not show a significant treatment effect, as measured by 
the M.D.I., for female subjects. 
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2. It was possible to develop an instrument for assess­
ing moral development in first-grade children, using the 
index guilt for measuring moral development level. The 
reliability and validity analyses of the Moral Development 
Inventory indicated that more research was needed before it 
could be used as an instrument for individual prediction, 
but it functioned well in measuring treatment effect. 
3. Three levels of guilt, as described by Hoffman and 
Saltzstein (1967), did appear in the first-grade subjects. 
4. Male and female subjects did differ in level of 
moral development as measured by the M.D.I, in both the 
control and experimental groups. 
5. The induction technique for fostering moral devel­
opment would seem to be an effective child-rearing procedure 
for producing moral children, especially males. 
Recommendations 
Based upon the procedures, findings, and conclusions of 
the study, the following recommendations for future research 
are suggested: 
1. The effectiveness of the induction child-rearing 
method should be studied experimentally. The method in the 
present study of using morality stories that illustrated the 
induction technique infers, but does not prove, that the 
induction child-rearing method produces moral children. 
Parents could be taught the induction method, perhaps by a 
simulated situation technique, and the M.D.I, could be used 
to assess the effectiveness of that procedure. 
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2. The type of literature that is used in the schools 
should be considered in terms of its effect on the moral 
development of the students. Parents have shown great con­
cern about the removal of certain books from school libraries 
and classrooms, especially books dealing with sex and vio­
lence. A more positive approach is warranted. Parents 
should show more concern about the addition of books to the 
libraries and classrooms that illustrate the induction pro­
cess, i.e., instruct the child concerning the consequences of 
his bad deeds on other persons. 
3. One of the aims of the present research was to deter­
mine whether three levels of guilt existed in first-grade 
children. Younger children need to be tested to determine 
the age when the emotion guilt first appears and at what 
ages it begins to increase in intensity. 
4. The M.D.I, should be further evaluated. 
a. The test was designed for first-grade children. 
Its utility for younger and older children should be explored. 
b. The samples in the present study were predom­
inantly white, middle-class. Southerners. Samples differing 
in demographic complexion are needed so that more generaliza­
tions from the M.D.I, scores could be made. Children in 
private church schools could be compared with public school 
children. The M.D.I, scores should be higher, as the church 
school children are usually exposed to more morality-content 
stories. 
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c. The M.D.I, should be administered under condi­
tions of greater experimenter control. These conditions 
include reliability checks on the test administrator, inves­
tigation of the effect of tester variables such as race, 
age, and sex, using a test administrator who is blind to the 
hypotheses, and 'determining how much training is necessary 
for the test administrator. 
d. Retest after a longer period than one week, or 
develop alternate forms. A test instrument that utilizes 
story situations may be retesting the subject's memory 
rather than the test construct. Alternate forms could reduce 
the instrument effect in a pre- or posttest experiment, thus 
increasing validity. 
e. The M.D.I, scores were correlated with language 
grade scores and with teacher ratings of the subjects' moral­
ity. Additional measures for correlational analysis are peer 
ratings, physiological measurements on the subject while he 
is tested, parent ratings, and observations in behavioral 
situations. The M.D.I, should also be correlated with IQ 
scores. Miller and Swanson (1960) did not find moral develop­
ment related to IQ. The positive relationship between M.D.I 
scores in the present study and the language scores of the 
subjects indicates that more research is needed in this area 
to substantiate that the M.D.I, is measuring something other 
than intelligence. 
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f. Follow up studies could determine whether first 
graders who scored high on the M.D.I, showed evidence of 
higher morality later in life. This would strengthen the 
predictive validity of the M.D.I. 
g. Correlate the M.D.I, scores with scores on a 
test of empathy. Empathy appears to be the cornerstone for 
the effectiveness of the induction method. If so, there 
should be a high correlation between empathy and M.D.I, 
scores. 
h. Administer the test with and without the pic­
tures. If the results do not vary, the test might be easier 
to administer without the pictures. 
i„ If different samples yield the same treatment 
effect with males and not with females, as in the present 
study, more work should be done on the M.D.I. Perhaps the 
test could be lengthened, or a broader range of situations 
could be included in the Inventory Stories. The treatment 
conditions should also be altered to determine whether the 
insignificant treatment effect with the females was a func­
tion of the treatment or the instrument. A longer treatment 
should be considered, and retest measurements taken per­
iodically to determine the stability of the treatment effect 
over time. 
j. Directly test the sex of the protagonist effect 
by using the same situation-story but changing the sex of 
the protagonist. Male and female scores on this variable 
could be compared. 
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k. The researcher has a responsibility of integrity 
when working with human subjects in the area of morality, 
but especially so when working with young children. The 
researcher must show sensible regard for the social and moral 
codes of the community in which he works and must avoid any 
exercise of excessive and unwarranted control over the per­
sonal destinies of children. Sugarman (1970) discussed the 
responsibility that research has to the public in truthful 
reporting of results and avoiding of excess claims of results 
or unwarranted generalizations from specific pieces of evi­
dence. In the present study, the researcher has given 
special consideration to the matter of ethics in dealing 
with children in the treatment procedures, in the testing 
situation, and in the handling of the data. 
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Appendix A 
Kohlberg's Definition of Moral Stages 
I. Preconventional level 
At this level, the child is responsive to cultural 
rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but 
interprets these labels either in terms of the physical or 
the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, 
exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of 
those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is 
divided into the following two stages: 
Stage 1: The punishment-and-obedience orientation. 
The physical consequences of action determine its goodness 
or badness, regardless of the human meaning or value of these 
consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning 
deference to power are valued in their own right, not in 
terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported 
by punishment and authority (the latter being Stage 4). 
Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation. 
Right action consists of that which instrumentally satis­
fies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. 
Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market­
place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal 
sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a 
physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you 
scratch my back and 1111 scratch yours," not of loyalty, 
gratitude, or justice. 
136 
II. Conventional level 
At his level, maintaining the expectations of the indi­
vidual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable 
in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious con­
sequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to 
personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to 
it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the 
order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved 
in it. At this level, there are the following two stages: 
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy— 
nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases 
or helps others and is approved by them. There is much con­
formity to stereotypical images of what is' majority or 
"natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by inten­
tion— "he means well"- becomes important for the first time. 
One earns approval by being nice. 
Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is 
orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance 
of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's 
duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given 
social order for its own sake. 
III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level 
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral 
values and principles that have validity and application 
apart fr'~>m the authority of the groups or persons holding 
these principles and apart from the individual's own identi­
fication with these groups. This level also has two stages: 
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Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic orientation, 
generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to 
be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards 
which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the 
whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism 
of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis 
upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what 
is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right 
is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result 
is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an 
emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of 
rational consideration of social utility (rather than freez­
ing it in terms of Stage- 4 "law and order"). Outside the 
legal realm, free agreement and contract are the binding element 
of obligation. This is the official morality of the American 
government and constitution. 
Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation. 
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with 
self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical compre­
hensiveness, universality#and consistency. These principles 
are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical 
imperative): they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten 
Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of 
justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights and 
of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. 
—"From Is to Ought," pp. 164-165. 
Reprinted from The Journal 
of Philosophy, October 26, 
1973 
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Appendix B 
Story Completion Guilt Ratings as Adapted 
from Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) 
Rating Weight Description 
low 1 Story ending contains no explicit guilt. 
Guilt is externalized or denied. Mild 
cognitive terms are used rather than 
feeling terms, e.g., "He knew he was 
cheating." 
medium 2 Story ending contains moderate though 
clear-cut guilt feelings. Usually indi­
cated by use of mild feeling terms, 
e.g., "after thinking about it, he gave 
the prize to the real winner." 
high 3 At this level, the guilt varies from a 
very intense, severe reaction that may 
not last very long, to one that is not 
so intense but lasts a day or longer. 
Examples are as follows: 
(1) They got little sleep worrying 
about the accident they caused, 
(2) He threw the prize down the sewer. 
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Appendix C 
Moral Inventory for First-Grade Children 
Story 1: 
Johnny1s mother went to the store and left Johnny with 
a babysitter. While the babysitter was watching television, 
Johnny sneaked into the kitchen to get some cookies his 
mother had told him not to eat before his supper. Johnny 
accidentally knocked the cookie plate on the floor: and 
immediately" Taffy, the dog, ran over and started eating the 
spilled cookies- The babysitter walked in, looked at Taffy 
eating the cookies, and said, "Oh, that bad dog to get into 
the cookies. I will have to spank him." The babysitter then 
started to get a switch to spank Taffy. 
Which of these endings to the story do you think is the 
best ending? Wait until you have heard all three endings 
before you choose the best ending. 
a. Johnny was happy because no one knew that he had 
sneaked the cookies. 
b. Johnny felt bad after Taffy got a spanking. He 
told the babysitter what had really happened. 
c. He couldn't watch when the babysitter whipped 
Taffy. Later he hugged Taffy and cried and cried. 
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Moral Development Inventory: Story 1 
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Story 2: 
Jenny was playing in the yard by herself when she 
noticed a broken Coca-Cola bottle on the ground near the 
porch. Just as she started to pick it up carefully and place 
it in the trash can, her friend Susan called to her, "Jenny, 
come on over to my house and see my new game." Jenny 
immediately forgot about the dangerous broken bottle and ran 
over to Susan's house. The two girls played with the game 
most of the afternoon. When Jenny went home she found out 
that her baby brother had fallen and cut his foot very badly 
on that broken Coca-Cola bottle . 
Which of these endings to the story do you think is the 
best ending? Wait until you have heard all three endings 
before you choose the best ending. 
a. Jenny told her brother to always wear shoes when he 
played in the yard. It was his fault that he cut 
his foot. 
b„ Jenny was sad because she had not picked up the 
bottle. She told her brother she was sorry about 
his cut foot. 
c. Everytime Jenny looked at her brother's cut foot, 
she felt sad all over again that she had not picked 
up the bottle. She stayed home all week and played 
with her brother. 
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Moral Development Inventory: Story 2 
143 
Story 3: 
David's first-grade teacher said that she would give a 
prize to the boy or girl who drew the best picture of a farm. 
David could not draw very well, but he really wanted the 
prize. Just as David was beginning to work on his picture, 
he remembered that he had a very nice picture of a farm in 
his desk. It was one his older brother had drawn for him a 
few days ago. When he was sure that no one was looking, David 
took out his brother's picture and put his own name on it 
before turning it in to the teacher. When the teacher judged 
the pictures, she chose David's picture as the best.. No one 
* / 
knew that David's brother had drawn the picture. David 
received the prize, and all of the children clapped to show 
David how happy they were that he could draw such a fine 
picture. 
Which of these endings to the story do you think is the 
best ending? Wait until you have heard all three endings 
before you choose the best ending. 
a. David was happy because he had the prize. He took 
the prize home and showed it to his mother. 
b. He felt sad because it wasn't really his drawing. 
He gave the prize back to the teacher. 
c. All the way home from school, he felt terrible 
about signing his name on his brother's picture. 
He tore the picture up and threw it away. 
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Moral Development Inventory: Story 3 
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Story 4: 
Betty's mother went to visit a friend who was in bed 
sick. Before she left, Betty's mother told her to finish 
peeling all of the potatoes and cut them up so that they 
would be ready to cook for dinner. Betty had peeled all but 
two of the potatoes when several of her friends came by and 
invited her to go to the park with them. Betty took the two 
potatoes she had not peeled and threw them down the garbage 
disposal along with the potato peelings and went with her 
friends. 
Which of these endings to the story do you think is the 
best ending? Wait until you have heard all three endings 
before you choose the best ending. 
a. Betty never told her mother about the two potatoes 
she had thrown away because everyone had enough 
potatoes to eat. 
b. At dinner time Betty kept looking at her mother to 
see if her another had noticed that., some potatoes 
. > 
were missing. 
c. Betty could not eat the potatoes at dinner time, 
because she felt so bad about disobeying her mother. 
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Moral Development Inventory: Story 4 
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Appendix D 
Scoring Sheet for Moral Development Inventory 
Directions: The story endings are to be presented in random 
order, using the following combinations: 
abc, acb, cba, be a, bac. Circle the 
letter of the response given. On the line beside 
each letter, list the order of presentation. 
First name of child 
Group 
Sex 
Responses: 
Story 1: 
a . 
b . 
c. 
Story 2: 
a . 
b . 
c. 
Story 3: 
a . 
b . 
c.. 
Story 4: 
a . 
b . 
c. 
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Appendix E 
Form for Teacher to Fill Out 
One on Each Child 
—adapted from Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) 
I. If (first name of child) found a quarter 
in the classroom and no one saw him/her, do you think 
he/she would (mark only one) 
1. bring the quarter to you 
2. keep the quarter 
3. keep the quarter but show some sign of concern 
over doing this 
II. In your opinion, how does (same child) typ­
ically react when "caught doing something wrong"? 
(mark two) 
1. looks for someone else to blame 
2. where possible tries on his own initiative to 
rectify the situation 
3. cries, looks sad, seems to feel bad 
4. makes excuses 
5. accepts responsibility for what he has done 
6. denies he did it 
Code for scoring: 
I. 1-3 points 
2 - 1  p o i n t  
3 - 2  p o i n t s  
II. 1-1 point 
2 - 3  p o i n t s  
3 - 2  p o i n t s  
4 - 2  p o i n t s  
5 - 3  p o i n t s  
b - 1 point 
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Appendix F 
Control Treatment Stories 
Austin, M. Poppet. In Childcraft: The how and why library 
(Vol. 2). Chicago: Field Enterprises Educational Cor­
poration, 1976. 
Brown, M. W. Willie's pockets. In J. Hale & M. Johnstone 
(Eds.), Through golden windows; Good times together. 
Eau Claire, Wisconsin: E. M. Hale, 1958. 
Bryon, D. There was Tammie. In J. Hale & M. Johnstone 
(Eds.), Through golden windows: Good times together. 
Eau Claire, Wisconsin: E. M. Hale, 1958. 
Clark, M. The white goat. In J. Hale & M. Johnstone (Eds.), 
Through golden windows: Good times together. Eau Claire, 
Wisconsin: E. M. Hale, 1958. 
Haywood, C. Circuses are fun. In J. Hale and M. Johnstone 
(Eds.), Through golden windows: Good times together. 
Eau Claire, Wisconsin: E. M. Hale, 1958. 
Experimental Treatment Stories 
Broken window. In S. W. Lindberg, The annotated McGuffey. 
New York: Van Nostrand Rheinhold, 1976. 
Golden rule. In H. H. Vail (Ed.), McGuffey's fourth eclectic 
reader (Rev. ed.). New York: American Book Company, 
1920. 
Halvar's house. In Childcraft: The how and why library. 
Chicago: Field Enterprises Educational Corporation, 
1976. 
No crown for me. In H. H. Vail (Ed.), McGuffey's third 
eclectic reader (Rev. ed.). New York: American Book 
Company, 1920. 
Thoughtless boys. In S. W. Lindberg, The annotated McGuffey. 
New York: Van Nostrand Rheinhold, 1976. 
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Appendix G 
True-False Quiz for Control Treatment Stories 
Story: "Poppet" 
1. Poppet was a dog. (false) 
2. Poppet wanted to hunt for a bear. (true) 
3. Poppet went hunting with a bag. (true) 
Story: "Circuses are Fan" 
1. Betsy wanted to be a bareback rider when she grew up. 
(true) 
2. Miss Grey's first-grade class decided to give a circus 
performance. (true) 
3. The organ-grinder lost his dog. (false) 
Story: "There Was Tammie" 
1. Tammie was a cat. (false) 
2. Tammie kept trying to follow the automobile. (true) 
3. Tammie got lost and never was found. (false) 
Story: "Willie's Pockets" 
1. Willie's new suit had 20 pockets. (false) 
2. Willie put a handkerchief in one of his pockets. (true) 
3. At the end of the day, Willie had all of his pockets 
full. (true) 
Story: "The White Goat" 
1. Andrewshek liked to swing on the gate. (true) 
2. Andrewshek's aunt's name was Sarah. (false) 
3. The white goat climbed on top of the roof. (true) 
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Appendix G 
True-False Quiz for Experimental Treatment Stories 
Story: "No Crown for Me" 
1. The person v'hc told Susan to finish her work before she 
played was her father. (false) 
2. The crown was made of violet flowers. (true) 
2. what Susan did wrong was to deceive her grandmother. 
(true) 
Story: "The Broken Window" 
1. The boy who broke the window was named Samson. (false) 
2. The window was broken with a snowball. (true) 
3. George decided to pay for the window with his dollar. 
(true) 
Story: "The Thoughtless Boys" 
1. The first person who fell down was a farmer's boy who 
was not hurt. (true) 
2. The man who hurt his ankle was running to the store to 
buy bread. (false) 
3. Edward and William learned that playing tricks on people 
can bring much harm to them and to others. (true) 
Story: "Halvar's House" 
1. Halvar was a very small man. (false) 
2. Halvar gave the stranger 7 fat goats for one skinny 
cow. (true) 
3. Halvar's house was filled with happiness because Halvar 
was good to other people. (true) 
Story: "The Golden Rule" 
1. The Golden Rule says that you should always buy groceries 
on Saturday. (false) 
2. Susan received too much money from farmer Thompson, but 
she kept it herself. (false) 
3. Susan was happy because she had obeyed the Golden 
Rule. (true) 
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True-False Test for Treatment Stories 
Instructions to be read to students: I am going to read you 
a sentence about the story you have just heard. If the sen­
tence is right, or true, marlc the circle next to the smiling 
face. If the sentence is false, or not true, mark the circle 
next to the frowning face. 
